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Abstract
We estimate the causal impact of a sizable German infrastructure investment
program on employment at the county level. The program focused on improving
the energy efficiency of school buildings, making it possible to use the number of
schools as an instrument for investments. We find that the program was effective,
creating one job for one year for each €25’000 of investments. The employment
gains reached their peak after nine months and dropped to zero quickly after the
program’s completion. The reductions in unemployment amounted to two-thirds
of the job creation, and employment grew predominately in the construction and
non-tradable industries.
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1 Introduction
Infrastructure investment is an important tool of fiscal policy that has been used heavily
in recent years. Infrastructure investment programs were major parts of the stimulus
programs that were enacted in the wake of the Great Recession to bolster economic
conditions (OECD, 2009). More recently, there have been calls for governments to cap-
italize on the low borrowing costs by increasing their investments in the infrastructure
to reduce the output gap when output is below its potential (IMF, 2014). Despite their
widespread use, it is debated whether infrastructure investments constitute an effective
tool of countercyclical fiscal policy. Proponents argue that public investments directly
create jobs and possibly pay a double dividend by increasing the future growth poten-
tial. In contrast, opponents worry that job creation via public investments crowds out
private sector employment and that the long planning periods of investment projects
prevent putting people to work quickly in times of economic crisis.
Do countercyclical infrastructure investments create jobs quickly and cost-effec-
tively? In this paper we answer this question for a sizable infrastructure investment
program of 0.63 percent of the GDP (€15.7 billion) that was a major component of the
German stimulus package during the Great Recession. Using cross-sectional data on
investments at the county level, we estimate the causal dynamic effect of investments
on aggregate and industry specific employment as well as on unemployment.
The unique set-up of the German investment program allows us to address three
key challenges for the evaluation of countercyclical fiscal policy in general and infras-
tructuexitrre investments in particular. The first challenge is that stimulus investment
programs are by construction endogenous to economic conditions. In particular, many
stimulus packages—including the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
and the German investment program studied here—share the characteristic that states
have a high level of discretion in distributing federal funds to regions. As a consequence
states potentially channeled funds towards those regions that were (or were expected
to be) hit the hardest by the recession. We address this endogeneity problem by ex-
ploiting the legal structure of the stimulus bill. The bill prescribed that 65 percent of
funds had to be spent on investments in the educational infrastructure, in particular
on improving the energy efficiency of existing buildings.1 This implies that the local
1The remaining 35 percent were earmarked for investments in the general local infrastructure
like the renovation of public buildings or the construction of broadband infrastructure. In general,
there were detailed conditions for projects to be financed via stimulus funds, because the German
1
scope for investments was closely linked to the historically predetermined number of
schools. Since the number of schools is a persistent stock variable and thus unrelated
to the magnitude of the recession in a county, it constitutes an ideal instrument for
local investments.
The second challenge is that the evaluation of stimulus investment programs is
frequently inhibited by the lack of identifying variation in the data. Stimulus programs
affect the entire economy so that it is difficult to separate the effect of stimulus spending
from contemporaneous shocks using longitudinal data only (Parker, 2011). Meaningful
cross-sectional variation in spending on infrastructure, in turn, is often confined to
the state level due to the large scale of most infrastructure investment programs (e.g.,
highway construction). For the investment program studied here, in contrast, there is
ample and meaningful variation in investments across the 402 German counties that
can be used to identify the effect of infrastructure investments on local labor markets.
This is due to the requirement of the stimulus bill that at least 70 percent of funds had
to be used for financing projects at the municipal or county level.
The third challenge is that public investments often have long implementation lags.
As a consequence, anticipation effects make it difficult to identify the correct time
window during which the effect of the investments on the economy should be observed.
However, if the empirical analyses are conducted for the wrong time window, the
results may be downward biased (see, e.g., Leeper et al., 2010; Ramey, 2011b; Leduc
and Wilson, 2013). In this paper we can estimate the total effects of the investment
program, because it was implemented following a strict and well-defined schedule. The
stimulus bill took effect in January 2009, projects had to be underway by the end of
2010, and all the funds had to be spent by the end of 2011. Hence, there is little room
for anticipation effects or implementation lags so that the main employment effects of
the program are expected to be observed between 2009 and the end of 2011.
Results We find that infrastructure investments increased employment cost-effectively.
The instrumental variable (IV) estimates imply that additional investments of €100’000
led to a gain of four job years. This point estimate corresponds to costs per job year
of €25’000 (equivalent to $34’200 according to the average euro-dollar exchange rate
constitution heavily restricts the federal government’s means to implement regional policies. The
detailed funding requirements thus ensured that constitutional restrictions were met, and investments
at the local level—the main goal of the program—were made possible. For details regarding the
program (called Zukunftsinvestitionsgesetz), see Section 2.
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between Q1 2009 and Q4 2011). Compared with the yearly union wages in construc-
tion—the primary target industry—of at least €30’000, this implies a substantial local
“wage multiplier,” the ratio between the costs per job year and the wage, of 1.2.
The infrastructure investment program also had a quick impact. The effects built
up during the year 2010, indicating an implementation lag of three quarters, which
seems reasonable given that the projects had to be planned and approved before im-
plementation. This finding alleviates the common concern that the implementation of
investment programs takes such a long time that they are an ill-suited policy tool for
a downturn when quick reactions are required (Becker, 2009; Summers, 2008). More-
over, the employment effects estimated via IV drop sharply in the first quarter of 2012,
exactly at the time when all the infrastructure projects had to be completed. The
dynamic pattern of employment gains is thus precisely as expected given the design of
the program.
The employment gains are accompanied by a drop in unemployment of two to three
person-years per €100’000 of investments, one-half to three-quarters of the employment
gains. This result suggests that infrastructure investments increase the demand for
workers with a high likelihood of being unemployed, in contrast to the concern voiced
for example by Becker (2009) and Glaeser (2016), that investments predominantly
increase the demand for specialists who are already in short supply.
Finally, the data supports the hypothesis that the infrastructure investments pre-
dominantly increased employment in construction related industries as well as non-
tradable industries like retail and hospitality. The employment effects originate exclu-
sively from these industries with both contributing about half of the total employment
gains.
The identifying assumption of the IV strategy is that counties with different num-
bers of schools would have followed the same employment paths absent the stimulus
program. This assumption is untestable. However, the number of schools in Germany
is very persistent over time and hence unlikely to be correlated with economic condi-
tions in the short or medium run. This is because the schools build after World War
II and during the population boom of the 1960s and 1970s are sufficient to meet the
current demand in a time of an aging population so that the number of public buildings
has changed little since then. In fact, the number of schools in 1995 is an almost perfect
predictor of today’s number of schools, and our results are insensitive to the year in
which the number of schools is measured. Also, we show that the number of jobs is
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unrelated to the number of schools in the two years before the program, supporting
the credibility of the identifying assumption.
The results are unaffected by a variety of robustness and sensitivity checks. For
example, we rule out the potential concern that our estimates of the investment pro-
gram’s effectiveness are distorted by sizable regional spillovers across neighboring coun-
ties. We also control for the number of short-time workers—the extension of subsidized
short-time work was another main component of the German stimulus package—and
different indicators that may be correlated both with the employment outcomes and
with the number of schools (like the educational structure of the workforce) and show
that this leaves the conclusions unchanged.
Contribution This study is the first to show that infrastructure investments can be
a cost-effective way to quickly create jobs in a downturn so that infrastructure invest-
ments can be a suitable tool to counteract a beginning recession. As such, our work is
related to a small recent literature that uses cross-sectional data together with plau-
sible identification strategies to estimate the economic consequences of infrastructure
investments.2 For normal economic times, Acconcia et al. (2014) show that sudden
contractions of public works due to Mafia infiltration of city councils in Italy led to im-
mediate reductions in output with a multiplier of 1.5–1.9.3 Furthermore, there is mixed
evidence regarding the local economic effects of highway construction. Leduc and Wil-
son (2013) use institutional details of the distribution of highway grants among states
in the U.S. to identify unanticipated investment shocks. The local multiplier from
2The bulk of the evidence concerning the effect of public investment on income and employment
comes from vector auto regression (VAR) approaches and points towards multipliers around one (e.g.,
Pereira, 2000; Perotti, 2004; Kamps, 2005; see also Leduc and Wilson, 2014, for a recent survey). This
literature builds on the structural VAR approach of estimating the multiplier of aggregate govern-
ment spending pioneered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and
Owyang et al. (2013) explore whether the aggregate spending multiplier differs between recessions
and expansions, a topic that is particularly relevant when discussing countercyclical policy. Ramey
(2011a) provides a recent review of the literature for the effects of aggregate spending in the U.S.;
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) summarize the results for Europe. The benefit of the VAR studies is
that they estimate, in principle, the aggregate effect of fiscal investments, taking general equilibrium
effects at the national level into account. In panel data approaches like ours, in contrast, the time
fixed effects typically difference out all effects operating on the national level. However, the benefit of
estimating the aggregate effect from time series data comes at the cost of strong timing assumptions
for identification. See Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Farhi and Werning (2016), and Dupor (2016)
for details on the connection of the aggregate and the local multiplier.
3Also for Italy, Porcelli and Trezzi (2014) find much smaller multipliers from reconstruction grants
following an earthquake. However, local spillovers may be an issue, as “treated” and “untreated”
municipalities are both within a radius of about 50 km from the earthquake’s epicenter.
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these shocks may be as high as 8 at its peak, but with a lag of six to eight years
after the shock. These lags may also account for the findings of Garin (2016), who
uses a selection-on-observables strategy and finds only a small immediate effects of the
ARRA highway construction grants on local markets.4 Another way to reconcile the
latter findings with the evidence presented in this paper is that investment projects
requiring relatively standard types of labor, like the building renovations studied here,
have a more direct impact on local markets than projects requiring specialized firms,
which operate nationwide, like highway construction. In this case, the composition of
stimulus programs would be of first order importance for their effectiveness.
By isolating the effect of one particular stimulus measure, this study also adds to
the literature evaluating the effectiveness of stimulus programs in general. A number of
papers estimated the combined effects of the different stimulus measures (e.g., transfers
to individuals, financing of public employment, or infrastructure investments) included
in the ARRA (Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2011; Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012; Wilson, 2012;
Conley and Dupor, 2013; Dube et al., 2014; Dupor and McCrory, 2015; Dupor and
Mehkari, 2016).5 The costs per job year for the aggregate stimulus reported in this
literature vary widely between $26’000 (Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012) and $202’000
(Conley and Dupor, 2013); our estimates are at the lower end of this range. One
possible reason for the comparably low estimates is that infrastructure investments are
a particularly effective stimulus measure. Another possible reason is that we consider
the full employment dynamics of the investment program—from the beginning of 2009
to the end of 2011—while the earlier studies of the ARRA focus on the period from
early 2009 to mid or late 2010. Indeed, the bulk of the employment gains that we find
comes from the second half of the program’s time window, consistent with Dupor and
McCrory (2015) showing that a large fraction of the ARRA gains accrued in 2011 and
4Leduc and Wilson (2015) focus on documenting that the ARRA’s federal highway construction
grants did not crowd out of investments by the states, but also estimate relatively high costs per job
year of $ 500’000 within the road construction sector. However, this estimate does not account for
spillover effects into other parts of the economy. In contrast, Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), who mainly
measure the overall effectiveness of the ARRA, provide a single but noisy estimate showing that the
highway grants have been among the most effective measures of the ARRA in creating jobs.
5Other papers use disaggregate data to assess the local economic effects of total non-defense gov-
ernment spending in normal economic times. For the U.S., Shoag (2010) and Suárez Serrato and
Wingender (2016) find costs per job year between $25’000 and $35’000 for total local government
spending, wich are close to our estimates for countercyclical investments. Clemens and Miran (2012)
find smaller effects. There is also evidence for the heterogeneity of the effectivenss of fiscal spending
with respect to the underlying economic conditions both for Brazil (Corbi et al., 2014) and Germany
(Buchheim et al., 2016). Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan (2016) provide a review of the literature.
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Structure of the Paper The next section describes the German stimulus investment
program. Section 3 briefly describes the data used, Section 4 presents the empirical
model, and Section 5 outlines the identification strategy. In Section 6 we discuss
the main results, the dynamic effects of stimulus investments on employment and
unemployment. Section 6 also provides extensive robustness checks. The last section
concludes.
2 The German Stimulus Investment Program
The investment program (called Zukunftsinvestitionsgesetz) was the major government
spending measure within the two German stimulus packages enacted during the peak
of the Great Recession. It stipulated investments of €13.3 billion into the general
local infrastructure. Due to extensive co-financing of the states, €15.83 billion or 0.64
percent of the pre-crisis GDP (in 2008) was in fact spent.7
The aim of the investment program was to stimulate the economy at the local level
by providing local governments with federal funds. However, because investments at
the state level or below are within the authority of the states, the German Constitu-
tion severely limits the means of the federal government to finance local investments
(Art. 104b Grundgesetz). Specifically, admissible local investment programs need to
fulfill three requirements. First, the provision of investment funds to the states can
only be temporary. Second, the type of investment projects to be financed must be
specified by law. Third, the federal government can only provide transfers, so that the
6By finding sizable macroeconomic effects for infrastructure investments, this paper also adds to the
research that studies the impact of other particular countercyclical policies. Dupor and Mehkari (2015)
evaluate the effects of the Department of Education’s grants within the ARRA, finding negligible
effects of these short-lived grants on employment in the education sector. Parker et al. (2013) find
that consumers spent between 50 and 90 percent of the tax rebates that they received during the
beginning of the Great Recession. For the cash for clunkers program in the U.S., Mian and Sufi
(2012) and Green et al. (2016) estimate that $2.85 billion in subsidies caused an short lived demand
increase (and a subsequent demand reversal) of 360’000 to 540’000 cars, but did not affect local
employment.
7In addition, the stimulus packages contained two smaller investment programs providing €6 billion
for investments at the federal level (mainly in the transportation infrastructure), reductions in taxes
and social security contributions of €66.2 billion, and subsidies of €9.4 billion (mainly for a cash-for-
clunkers program). The package also contained direct labor market interventions such as an extension
of the duration of short-time work benefits to workers of firms in temporary financial distress. See
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2011) for details.
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decisions regarding which projects will receive funding is at the discretion of the state
governments.
For these reasons, the stimulus bill (the Zukunftsinvestitionsgesetz as well as the
accompanying implementation bill) entailed detailed requirements for projects to be
financed via federal funds. Specifically, the bill mandated that 65 percent of funds
were to be used for investments in the educational infrastructure. This first funding
line authorized investments in (pre-)schools, universities, and research institutes with
an emphasis on the energy-saving remodeling of existing buildings. The remaining 35
percent of funds had to be used for investments in the general public infrastructure, in
particular hospitals, urban development, broadband infrastructure, and roadway noise
mitigation. To reduce the fungibility of the funds, only “new and additional” projects
could be financed. In practice this implied that projects that were already budgeted
in a public account could not receive financing from the program.8
In addition to these restrictions on the types of investment projects, the bill required
that projects were implemented locally. It mandated that 70 percent of the funds were
to be spent on infrastructure investments at the county or municipal level. In fact,
the majority of states, particularly the larger ones, spent more than 75 percent (with
a maximum of 87.3 percent) of the funds locally (Bundesministerium der Finanzen,
2013b). The federal government also loosened the rules for public procurement to
speed up the implementation of projects. According to the German Court of Auditors,
this led to a substantial increase in the share of contracts awarded to local firms for
the projects financed by the program (Bundesrechnungshof, 2012).
The federal government provided €10 billion for investments and distributed these
funds among the states following a standard formulary allocation factor. The federal
funds were matching grants financing at most 75 percent of the project costs; the re-
maining 25 percent of the funds (or more) had to be provided by the states or more
regional layers of government (counties and municipalities). The latter contributed
more than the required €3.3 billion so that the total spending equaled €15.83 billion.
The final selection of the investment projects to be financed from these funds was at
the discretion of the states. While the exact allocation mechanisms differed widely
across states, most of them used a combination of the following three procedures: (i)
the formulary allocation of funds to local layers of government (based on, e.g., the pop-
8In Appendix C.1 we demonstrate that the fungibility of the investment funds was indeed limited
so that the crowding-out of other local public investments can be ruled out. If anything, there seems
to have been crowding-in of local public investments.
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ulation, the number of school students, or the area), (ii) a state-wide selection among
project proposals of regional layers of government, and (iii) the direct implementation
of projects through the state government (Slansky, 2010).
The program was implemented swiftly. The first parliamentary hearings took place
on January 12, 2009. The parliament passed the bill on March 5, and states had to
report their implementation procedures to the federal government by May 30. Projects
could receive financing from the program if they had been started on January 27, 2009,
or later, and all projects had to be under way by the end of 2010. Projects had to be
completed by the end of 2011, less than three years after the passage of the program.
In fact, of the €10 billion in federal funds, for which we know the dynamics of spending
over time, 12.6 percent were spent in 2009, 41.3 percent were spent in 2010, and the
remaining 46.1 percent were spent in 2011 (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2011,
2012, 2013a).
3 Data and Identifying Variation
This section describes the main variables of interest with a focus on countercyclical
investments, the independent variable, as well as the number of schools, the instru-
mental variable, for both of which we highlight the variation across German counties.
Unless noted otherwise, all the variables are measured at the county level and normal-
ized by the county’s working-age population (between 15 and 65 years of age) in 2008.
This normalization facilitates the comparison of variables across counties. The data
appendix (Appendix A) provides additional details.
3.1 Employment and Unemployment
The Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) collects administrative
data on employment and unemployment. The data is of single-digit precision and
contains minimal sampling error. From this data we take the publicly available series
on total employment and total unemployment at the county level for each quarter
(measured on the last day of the quarter) for the years 2007 to 2013 and filter out
county-specific seasonal fluctuation using the interaction of county and quarter-of-year
fixed effects.9 The quarterly employment series counts every employed individual who
9The data thus includes the three years 2009–2011, during which the program was active as well
as two years before and after the program.
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lives within a county and pays social security contributions, including part-time workers
(as long as they earn more than €400 per month) but excluding the self-employed
and public servants. The series also includes workers by age bands. The quarterly
unemployment series contains every individual who lives within a county and receives
unemployment benefits.
In addition, we obtained the quarterly series of employment, disaggregated by the
three-digit industry code of the workers’ employers, directly from the Federal Employ-
ment Agency. Due to major changes made to the industry classification in 2008, this
data is available from 2008 onward.
3.2 Countercyclical Investments
The primary source for data on countercyclical investments is the complete, nation-
wide database of the 42’530 projects financed by the program, which we obtained from
the federal department of the treasury. This database exists because the stimulus bill
required state governments to document that their usage of funds was in accordance
with the legal requirements. As a consequence, the database contains the total in-
vestment in each project (summing up to €15.83 billion nationwide), the amount of
federal funds used (a total of €9.99 billion revealing that nearly all the federal funds
have been spent), and an indicator for the location where the project was conducted.10
Notably, there is no information on when the projects were implemented other than
the requirement of the bill that all investments had to take place between March 2009
and the end of December 2011.
Based on the projects’ locations, we aggregate the total investments at the county
level. Given this, the identification of the effect of countercyclical investments on
employment and unemployment rests on the cross-sectional variation in investments
across counties within states. Figure 1 plots this geographic variation in investments.
Counties are shaded according to their quintile in investments per capita relative to
their state-specific means. Figure 1 shows that, even for the raw data at the state
10By law, the states were also required to provide a short description of each project so that the
appropriate usage of funds could be verified. The department of the treasury did not pass on this
information. However, before receiving the complete project database from the federal government,
we collected the latest available versions of the project databases from the state governments. While
these databases are not entirely complete (they include 96 percent of projects and 95 percent of
investments), they contain the project descriptions for most states. In Appendix B.1 we use these
descriptions to verify that the number of schools predominantly predicts the number of school related
projects as well as investments in schools.
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Notes. This map shows the geographic distribution of countercyclical investments per capita across
counties in Germany. Investments are shown net of their state averages. The shading corresponds to
the quintiles in investments; darker shading indicates larger investments.
level, there is ample variation in investments across counties without any apparent
geographical clustering of regions with large or small investments. The inter-quintile
range of investments is €122 per capita, which is substantial compared with the average
investments of €282 per capita across Germany. For the mean county with a working-
age population of about 127’000 persons, the inter-quintile range corresponds to sizable
differences in total investments of €15.5 million.
3.3 Schools
The substantial discretion of states in the allocation of funds creates the potential for
a simultaneity problem, namely that states channeled funds into counties that were
expected to be affected severely by the crisis. To alleviate this problem, we exploit
the legal requirements of the stimulus bill and use the pre-crisis number of schools in
a county, as measured in 2008, to instrument for countercyclical investments.
10
Figure 2: The Distribution of Schools per Capita within States






























































































































































































































































































































































































Notes. This figure shows the variation in Academic High Schools and Primary and Secondary Schools
per 1000 individuals of working age across states. Each circle corresponds to one county and shows
the number of schools net of its state-specific average.
The German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) provides data on the number of
schools at the county level separately for five major and five minor school types. These
school types vary significantly in size. Because the size of a school determines the scope
for energy-saving remodeling, we sort the ten school types into two categories according
to their size. The first category, called “academic high schools,” encompasses two types
of secondary schools that award a degree (Abitur), which allows the pursuit of a college
education. A school in this category has 788 students on average. The second category
includes all the remaining school types, namely primary schools as well as secondary
schools that offer degrees which are the precondition for vocational training. We call
this category “primary and secondary schools.” A school in the latter category has 196
students on average so that academic high schools are typically around four times as
large as primary and secondary schools.11
Figure 2 displays the number of schools per 1000 individuals of working age within
the German states. Each circle represents the number of schools within one county
relative to their state-specific average. The number of schools varies considerably within
states. The maximum difference between the county with the lowest and the county
with the highest number of Primary and Secondary Schools per 1000 individuals equals
11Table 8 in Appendix A.2 provides additional information on the differences in school size across
all the school types as well as on the classification of schools.
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at least 0.3 to 0.4, which is sizable considering that the average is 0.55. The average
number of Academic High Schools per 1000 individuals is 0.07 so that the maximum
difference of 0.05 to 0.1 is large as well.
3.4 Control Variables
The empirical analyses at the county level ensure that the number of observations is
sufficiently high to control for a variety of potential confounding factors. In all the
empirical analyses, we control for population density via an urbanization index. The
index is published by the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning
and classifies each county, based on its total population and population density, as
either “very rural,” “rural,” “city,” or “major city.” In addition, we always control for
the growth of the working-age population (between 16 and 65 years of age) given by the
ratio of the current working-age population to the working-age population in 2008. The
population data was obtained from the German Statistical Office. For brevity, detailed
descriptions of all additional covariates are relegated to Appendix A.1. Unless noted
otherwise, the variables were obtained either from the Federal Employment Agency
(all the variables concerning employment, employment subsidies, or unemployment) or
the German Statistical Office (the vast majority of the remaining variables).
4 Empirical Model
The goal of the empirical strategy is to assess both the dynamic employment response
and the overall employment effect of the investment program. To this end, we use
a generalized difference-in-differences (DiD) framework to estimate the investment-
induced employment gains, denoted βt, for each quarter between Q1 2009 and Q4
2011. The employment gains are measured relative to Q4 2008, the last quarterly date
before the (retroactive) start of the investment program in January 2009. This ensures
that the estimated employment gains capture the possible anticipation effects as well
as all the direct effects. The dynamic employment response is then described by the
sequence {βt}
Q4 2011
t=Q1 2009 within the treatment period. The total number of job years














c Γt + ψ PopGrowthc,t + εc,t, (1)
where the index c denotes the county, t denotes the date (measured in quarters), and
“p.c.” (for “per capita”) in the variable name indicates that the variable is normalized
by the county’s working-age population measured in 2008. Investments are measured
in €100’000.12
To estimate the dynamic employment differences we interact the cross-sectional
data on investments with date dummies (denoted Datet), a standard method for iden-
tifying the dynamic effect of an intervention in a DiD design (Angrist and Pischke,
2009). Since the employment differences are estimated relative to Q4 2008, estimating
(1) delivers estimates of βt both for the dates after Q4 2008, when the effects of the
investments should be observed, and for the dates before Q4 2008, for which βt should
equal zero, since the investment program was neither active nor expected at that time.
Estimating βt for dates before Q4 2008 thus allows us to test whether the (instru-
mented) investments were, in fact, unrelated to the employment dynamics before the
program.
The set of control variables in (1) includes county fixed effects (denoted CountyFEc)
and date fixed effects for all state-urbanization strata (the urbanization strata are given
by the values of the urbanization index).13 The date fixed effects on the state level
are important to account for the link between the states’ economic conditions and the
federal transfers of investment funds via the formulary allocation factor, which includes
tax income as one of its arguments.14 The date fixed effects for each urbanization
12In Appendix C we verify that two alternative empirical specifications deliver estimates similar
to those from (1). In Appendix C.2, βt is estimated relative to all dates prior to Q1 2009, that is,
relative to the average employment between Q1 2007 and Q4 2008. In Appendix C.3 we collapse (1)
into a more parsimonious cross-sectional specification that allows us to estimate the job years created
by the program but not the dynamics of the employment responses.
13We include date fixed effects along the dimensions of state × urbanization in equation (1) by
adding the interactions of indicator variables for the states and indicator variables for the values of
the urbanization index to the vector CountyCharacteristicsc.
14Another reason for the inclusion of state fixed effects is that states differ widely in their education
policies, resulting in considerable differences in the public school system across states. Since the
investments targeted the educational infrastructure, there may be a potential link between investments
and employment dynamics at the state level. The time fixed effects on the state level account for
13
category control for potential differences in the employment dynamics across urban
and rural counties that may be correlated with urbanization-related differences in the
existing infrastructure. Notably, the date fixed effects also eliminate all the employment
differences due to policies at the state or federal level, including those that may dampen
the effectiveness of the investment program, such as monetary policy or tax changes
to maintain balanced budget requirements (see Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014, for an
extensive discussion of this issue).
We control flexibly for three additional county characteristics that may be cor-
related both with employment outcomes and with infrastructure investments. First,
employees with different levels of education may be affected differentially by the re-
cession. They may also have differential demands for schools, which determine the
scope for investments. For these reasons, the employment shares by education (with a
college degree, with completed vocational training) are included in the set of control
variables. Second, another plausible driver of the demand for schools is the school-
age population, which also determines the labor market inflow of young workers. We
thus add the number of individuals between 6 and 18 years of age as a share of the
working-age population to the set of covariates. Third, the numbers of hospitals and
universities within the county, normalized by the working-age population, constitute
two additional control variables. Hospitals and universities are more likely to be located
in regional centers with potentially distinct employment dynamics. At the same time,
they are determinants of the allocation of investment funds via two funding lines of
the infrastructure program. All the variables just mentioned are included in the vector
CountyCharacteristicsc with values as measured in the first quarter of 2008.
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Finally, we control for population growth using the ratio of the working-age popu-
lation at t to the working-age population in 2008 (denoted PopGrowthc,t).
5 Identification Strategy
The main concern for identification is that the state governments used the investment
funds to support those counties that they expected to be affected the worst by the
recession. As state governments are likely to have better information regarding the
trajectories of counties’ economies than is captured by observable covariates, it is ques-
these differences as well.
15The county characteristics described here are the covariates used in the main empirical analyses.
The robustness checks in Section 6.4 add additional variables to the empirical model.
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tionable whether this concern can be ruled out via controlling extensively for observable
county characteristics. However, if governments redirect stimulus funds to counties that
they expected to experience a weak labor market performance based on unobservable
information, Investmentsc and the error term εc,t are negatively correlated (at least
for t ≥ Q1 2009), and the OLS estimates of βt are biased towards zero.
We address this endogeneity problem using an IV strategy that exploits the legal
requirements of the stimulus bill regarding which type of projects can receive financing.
65 percent of stimulus funds had to be used for investments in the local educational
infrastructure, particularly for the energy-saving remodeling of existing buildings. The
number of buildings of the educational infrastructure—typically schools—within a
county thus determines, to a large extent, the scope for infrastructure investments.16
The empirical strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity problem just described
is hence to use the number of schools in 2008 as an instrument for the infrastructure
investments.
This section discusses the main assumptions of the IV strategy. The following
subsection presents the first stage. Section 5.2 argues that the exclusion restriction is
likely to be satisfied because the number of schools is strongly autocorrelated over long
time horizons so that the number of schools does not react to the regional economic
conditions in the short-run.
5.1 Relevance and First Stage
One main assumption of the IV strategy is that the instruments are relevant, that is,
the number of schools is a strong predictor of infrastructure investments. Typically,
the relevance of the instruments is tested using the first stage of the IV model. In the
empirical model (1), every interaction between Investmentsc and a date indicator is
an endogenous variable so that the first stage for (1) is a system of equations—one
equation for each interaction between Investmentsc and the indicator for date τ ∈
16Note that this holds even conditional on the number of children of schooling age, which determines
the demand for schools. If the number of students and the space every student requires are held
constant, a higher number of schools implies a greater scope for renovations. This is because the
volume of a body—in this case, the school building—grows faster than its surface area, and the latter
is what matters for a building’s energy efficiency.
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{Q1 2006,Q2 2006, . . . ,Q4 2008,Q2 2009, . . . ,Q4 2013}—of the following form:
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where Schoolsc = (Academic High Schools p.c.c, P rimary and Secondary Schools
p.c.c) is a vector containing both categories of schools defined in Section 3.3 and where
the index τ indicates the coefficients of the date-τ first stage.
A first stage with many endogenous variables and many instruments poses chal-
lenges for testing the validity of the instruments in conventional ways. For one, critical
values of conventional tests of weak instruments for large numbers of instruments and
endogenous variables are unavailable (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Moreover, the first stage
(2) is constructed in such a way that Dateτ × Schools
’
c, the instruments interacted
with the date τ indicator, are the only instruments with explanatory power for the
first stage equation with Investmentsc × Dateτ as the dependent variable. Hence,
each interaction with an additional date adds two uninformative instruments to each
first stage equation, which mechanically reduces the test statistics for joint significance
of all the instruments.17
Since the first stage is almost exclusively identified from cross-sectional variation,
we can infer the strength of the instruments from estimating a simple cross-sectional
variant of (2). This is because the system of equations defined by (2) closely resembles
a repeated cross-section, one for every date × investment interaction, since both the
instruments and the controls are interacted with date dummies. Indeed, the only
variable without a time-varying coefficient on the right-hand side of (2) is population
growth. For this reason, this section presents the result of estimating a variant of (2)
using only the cross-section of the data in Q4 2008.18
Table 1 shows that schools are a strong predictor of total investments in increasingly
demanding specifications of the cross-sectional variant of the first stage. Regardless
of whether we add the educational composition of the workforce in column (2), the
17We report the full first stage including test statistics for weak instruments for a version of (1) and
(2), in which we group the date interactions of Investmentsc and Schoolsc for the two-year periods
before and after the stimulus program as well as for the years during the program in Appendix B.2.
18Technically, this means that in (2) all the coefficients with t 6= Q4 2008 are set to zero. The
choice of Q4 2008 as the date of measurement for the cross-section is completely arbitrary and does
not affect the reported results.
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Table 1: First Stage
Countercyclical Investments p.c. in e100’000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Academic High Schools p.c. 17.47∗∗∗ 12.91∗∗∗ 11.81∗∗∗ 10.09∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.62) (2.74) (2.98)
Primary & Second. Schools p.c. 0.18 2.12∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗
(0.58) (0.69) (0.70) (0.65)
Empl. Share w College /100 1.25∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗
(0.36) (0.36) (0.34)
Empl. Share w Vocational Tr. /100 −0.14 −0.08 −0.10
(0.21) (0.22) (0.20)






State × UrbanIndex FE yes yes yes yes
Kleibergen–Paap F 21.36 19.80 17.90 9.77
Shea Partial R2 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.07
Observations 400 400 400 400
Notes. The dependent variable Countercyclical Investments p.c. in €100’000 is the sum of invest-
ments normalized by the working-age population (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”) over the years
2009 to 2011. Academic High Schools p.c. is the number of high schools in a county that award the
“Abitur,” the entry requirement for universities. Primary and Secondary Schools p.c. is the total
number of primary schools and secondary schools that offer degrees that allow the pursuit of voca-
tional training. Empl. Share w College and Empl. Share w Vocational Tr. are the share of employees
with a college degree and vocational training, respectively. Share School-Age Pop is the number of
individuals between 6 and 18 years of age as a fraction of the working-age population. Universities
p.c. and Hospitals p.c. are the number of universities and hospitals. State × UrbanIndex FE are fixed
effects for the interaction of indicator variables for the German states and for the values of a four-point
urbanization index. Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c. are the
excluded instruments for the Kleibergen–Paap F statistic and the Shea Partial R2. The sample is the
cross-section of counties as measured in Q4 2008. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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short-run demand for schools (the school-age population) in column (3), or other de-
terminants of infrastructure investments (the number of hospitals and universities) in
column (4), the Kleibergen–Paap Wald statistic of the instruments remains above or
very close to the conventional critical value of ten. We also report the Shea Partial
R2 of the instruments. The Shea Partial R2 varies less with the inclusion of uninfor-
mative instruments than the F statistic so that the comparison of the Shea Partial R2
from the full system of first stage equations as described by (2) with the one from the
cross-section as reported in Table 1 provides a useful assessment of the strength of the
instruments in the full, dynamic model.
To interpret the coefficients, note that they represent the average increase in invest-
ments (in €100’000) due to one additional school. This is because both schools and
investments are normalized by the working-age population. One additional academic
high school is hence associated with an increase in investments between €10.1 and
€17.5 million, while one additional primary or secondary school leads to an increase in
investments of €0.2 to €2.3 million.19
In Table 9 of Appendix B.1, we show that the number of schools predominantly
explains investments in schools.20 The results in Table 9 also shed light on the relatively
large difference between academic high schools and primary and secondary schools in
terms of the funding obtained per school. While parts of this difference may be due to
academic high schools being significantly larger than primary and secondary schools
(see Section 3.3and Appendix A.2), another part of the explanation is that academic
high schools received, on average, twice as many projects as primary and secondary
schools.
5.2 Exclusion Restriction
The second main assumption of the IV strategy is the exclusion restriction, which
requires the errors εc,t to be independent of the instruments. This implies that, con-
ditional on the covariates, schools may be correlated with employment outcomes only
via their effect on investments. Consistent with this assumption, Section 6.1 shows
that instrumented investments are indeed unrelated to employment outcomes before
19Note that the number of hospitals and universities is positively associated with investments as
well, as should be expected given the legal requirements of the investment program.
20Because project descriptions are unavailable in the data on investments used in the main body of
the paper, the analyses in Appendix B.1 use a different, slightly incomplete, data set on investments
that includes the project descriptions.
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Figure 3: The Autocorrelation of Schools between 1995 and 2008
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Notes. This figure displays, for each county, the number of schools (net of their state-specific averages
and separately for academic high schools and primary and secondary schools) in 2008 against the
number of schools in 1995.
the enactment of the stimulus program in Q1 2009.
For the time after the enactment of the program, the exclusion restriction is un-
testable. However, the number of schools in Germany is very persistent over time and
hence unlikely to be correlated with the economic conditions in the short or medium
run. Figure 3 illustrates this persistence by plotting the number of schools in 2008
against the number of schools in 1995 (the earliest date at which this data is available).
At both years, schools are measured relative to their state averages. For both Academic
High Schools and Primary and Secondary Schools, the data is tightly clustered around
the 45-degree line. This demonstrates that there are, indeed, at best minor changes in
the number of schools over time.21
The age distribution of public buildings from the German census of 2011 offers
another view of the persistence of schools. Of all non-residential public buildings with
one housing unit—the building category applicable to schools that comprise housing
for the school’s caretaker—43 percent were constructed before 1948, 84 percent before
1978, and 93 percent before 1995.22 The data hence indicates that the existing stock
of school buildings was predominantly constructed either prior to 1948, possibly at
21This is particularly true for the counties in the former West German states. The number of schools
in the former East German states is less persistent, possibly due to numerous reforms in the wake of
reunification. See Figure 5 in Appendix B.3.
22More precise data on the age distribution of school buildings is unavailable. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that the vast majority of schools comprises a housing unit.
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Notes. This figure shows the differences in employment per €100’000 invested, βt, at each quarterly
date t between Q1 2007 and Q4 2013 relative to Q4 2008, as well as their 90 percent confidence interval
as estimated via IV. The model includes the most comprehensive set of covariates, identical to the one
used in column (4) of Table (2). The left vertical line indicates the last date before the investment
program was passed into law; the right line indicates the first date after the end of the program.
the time of the introduction of universal public education in the late 19th century, or
during the 1960s and 1970s, when the baby boomer generation was of school-age. The
current demand for schools is declining due to population aging and hence is mostly
met by the existing buildings. The number of schools has thus predominantly been
determined by policy decisions made in the 1970s or earlier so that it is likely that
schools are independent of employment outcomes during the recession of 2009.
6 Results
This section presents the main findings. The empirical analysis shows that the in-
vestment program increased employment at low costs, with employment rising three
quarters after the program’s enactment. The employment gains were accompanied by
a drop in unemployment and were concentrated within the construction related sectors
as well as the local non-tradable sectors.
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6.1 Employment Dynamics
Figure 4 displays the employment dynamics caused by countercyclical investments.
It plots the IV coefficients of investments, {βt}t:t6=Q4 2008, along with their 90 percent
confidence interval, estimated using the model described by equations (1) and (2). Each
coefficient βt measures the average difference in the employment rate at date t relative
to Q4 2008 for additional investments of €100’000 per capita. As both employment
and investments are normalized by the working-age population, the coefficients can
also be interpreted as the difference in the number of employees between date t and
Q4 2008 per €100’000 invested.
The figure shows that, after the passage of the stimulus bill in Q1 2009, the first
date to the right of the first vertical line, employment started to increase with a lag of
three to four quarters in response to investments. Given that the first parliamentary
hearing of the bill took place in January 2009, when it was widely believed that the
bill would be passed into law, this implies a plausible planning period of about nine
to twelve months. The employment difference reached its peak of about two to three
additional employees per € 100’000 invested in 2011, before it dropped sharply in
Q1 2012, exactly at the time when the investment program ended (indicated by the
second vertical line). The employment dynamics are hence similar to the aggregate
spending pattern described in Section 2, according to which the majority of federal
funds was spent in 2010 and 2011. The dynamics also show that the program had a
reasonably quick impact on local economies.
Both before and after the program, the employment differences are, in general, sta-
tistically indistinguishable from zero. The post-program differences indicate that the
infrastructure investment program temporarily increased employment as intended, gen-
erating neither positive employment effects beyond the program’s duration nor negative
employment reversals. The pre-program employment differences may be interpreted
as a plausibility check of the exclusion restriction. If the exclusion restriction holds,
so that the number of schools affects employment only via its effect on infrastructure
investments, the number of schools should be unrelated to the employment outcomes
before the passage of the stimulus bill. It is hence reassuring that the estimated coef-
ficients of instrumented investments, which reflect the cross-sectional variation in the
number of schools, are indeed clustered around zero before the investment program
was enacted.
To quantify the employment gains, we compute the magnitude of the investment
21
program’s effect as the total difference in job years caused by investments of €100’000
during the program’s duration. In Figure 4, this statistic is given by the integral
of the employment difference between the two vertical lines indicating the last date
before and the first date after the program. The employment gains amount to about
four job years—or costs per job year of about €25’000—with corresponding 90 percent
confidence bounds of 0.2 to 7.8 job years.
Table 2 summarizes these employment effects across specifications. For conciseness
we reduce the number of coefficients by estimating the average quarterly employment
difference relative to Q4 2008 for all dates before the investment program (Q1 2007 to
Q3 2008) and after the end of the program (Q1 2011 to Q4 2013). During the program
(2009–2011), we estimate the average employment differences for each year, so that the
employment dynamics depicted in Figure 4 can also be read from the tables.23
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2 present IV estimates of increasing demanding em-
pirical specifications corresponding to the respective first stages reported in Table 1.
Column (1) reports the coefficient estimates for a model that only includes county fixed
effects, date fixed effects on the state × urbanization level, and population growth as
covariates. In column (2) we allow for date-specific effects of the employment structure
by education, as the educational attainment of the workforce may be related to the
demand for schools—the instrument—and the employment outcomes.24 Column (3)
adjusts for the short-run demand for schools by controlling for the school-age popu-
lation as a fraction of the labor force. In column (4) we add the number of hospitals
and universities, interacted with date fixed effects, to the model, primarily to capture
the determinants of investments stemming from funding lines not related to school
renovations.
The findings are similar across all the specifications. Regardless of the covariates
23Formally, we substitute the empirical model (1) with the following slight modification:












Γt + ψ PopGrowthc,t + ε̂c,t.
24Recall from Section 4 that the controls for the education structure are the shares of employees
with a college degree or higher and with vocational training; the omitted category is the share of
employees with less than vocational training. All the shares are measured in 2008 and interacted with
the full set of quarterly date fixed effects.
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Table 2: The Effects of Countercyclical Investments on Employment
Employment Rate
IV Estimates OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investments p.c.
× 2007–Q3 2008 0.18 0.50 0.39 0.16 −0.11 −0.09
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.48) (0.11) (0.13)
× 2009 −0.10 −0.22 0.10 −0.10 0.35∗∗ 0.12
(0.37) (0.42) (0.42) (0.54) (0.16) (0.15)
× 2010 0.87∗∗ 1.22∗∗ 1.55∗∗ 1.21 0.44∗ 0.12
(0.43) (0.55) (0.61) (0.78) (0.23) (0.22)
× 2011 2.23∗∗∗ 2.03∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 2.90∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.36
(0.67) (0.80) (0.89) (1.27) (0.30) (0.32)
× 2012–2013 2.50∗∗ −0.02 0.52 0.54 0.70 0.19
(1.06) (1.17) (1.26) (1.67) (0.45) (0.44)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Population Growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date Fixed Effects ×
State × UrbanIndex yes yes yes yes yes yes
Emp. Shares by Educ. no yes yes yes no yes
School Age Population no no yes yes no yes
Universities & Hospitals no no no yes no yes
min(Shea Partial R2) 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.07 . .
Job Years 2.99 3.03 4.19 4.00 1.43 0.60
90% CI of Job Years [0.9; 5.1] [0.4; 5.6] [1.3; 7.0] [0.2; 7.8] [0.4; 2.5] [-0.4; 1.6]
Costs per Job Year 33401 32964 23862 25001 69980 166670
SE Costs per Job Year 14022 17083 9880 14458 30630 173316
Observations 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200
Notes. The dependent variable is the employment rate on each quarterly date between Q1 2007 and
Q4 2013. Investments p.c. × 2007–Q3 2008 is the interaction of investments in €100’000 with an
indicator that equals one for the observations between 2007 and Q3 2008. All the other interactions are
defined accordingly; the baseline is Q4 2008. The horizontal lines between the estimates indicate the
beginning and the end of the stimulus program. Population Growth is the ratio of the current working-
age population and the working-age population in 2008. The following variables, measured in 2008,
are interacted with the full set of date fixed effects: State ×UrbanIndex (interactions of indicators for
the states and the values of the urbanization index), Emp. Shares by Educ. (shares of employees with
a college degree and with vocational training), School-Age Population, and Universities and Hospitals.
Min(Shea Partial R2) reports the minimum of the Shea R2 of the excluded instruments—the date
interactions of Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c.—among all the
first stages (one for each interaction of Investments p.c.). The number of Job Years is the sum of the
coefficients of Investments p.c. between 2009 and 2011. Costs per Job Year equal 100’000/Job Years.
The confidence intervals of Job Years and the standard errors of Costs per Job Year are calculated
via the Delta method. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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included, the investment-induced employment differences are statistically indistinguish-
able from zero before the investment program. After the program, the average employ-
ment difference is only positive in the most parsimonious specification, and statistically
zero in the remaining ones. When the program was active, in contrast, we find posi-
tive and economically relevant employment differences of 0.9 to 1.5 in 2010 and 2 to
2.9 in 2011 per €100’000 invested. With the exception of the coefficient for 2010 in
column (4), which has a p-value of 0.12, these coefficients are statistically significant
at least at the five percent level. The estimates translate into three to four job years
per €100’000 spent, or into costs per job year between €25’000 and €33’000. Given the
standard errors of the estimated costs per job year calculated via the Delta method,
the bounds of the union of all 90 percent confidence sets of the costs per job year across
specifications are €1’144 and €61’150.25
In addition to the IV estimates, Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 present the OLS
estimates of the most parsimonious and the most demanding specifications, respec-
tively. The estimated employment differences during the program period in column
(5) are at most half as large as the corresponding IV estimates. These estimates imply
that 1.4 job years were created per €100’000 spent, so the costs per job year are about
€70’000. Adding covariates, however, leads to a sharp drop in the coefficients, so the
employment gains of the program become statistically indistinguishable from zero and
economically irrelevant.
The magnitude of the employment effect can be interpreted by comparing the base-
line estimate of the costs per job year in column (4) of Table 2—€25’000— with the
wages in construction, the main target industry of the investment program. Since there
is no information on the marginal worker employed through the investment program,
we use different yearly wages for this comparison: the minimum wage in construction
of about €23’000, the union wages of construction workers ranging from €30’000 to
€38’000, or the average labor costs in the entire construction sector (including admin-
istrative and management jobs) of about €45’000.26 These wages imply substantial
25Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2 also report the minima of the Shea Partial R2 across all the first
stage equations of the relevant model to facilitate the comparison of the instruments’ strength with
the corresponding cross-sectional first stage equation in Table 1. Because the first stage is identified
exclusively from cross-sectional variation, it comes as no surprise that the minima of the Shea Partial
R2 are equal to the ones from the cross-sections. For additional details on the first stage see Appendix
B.2, which reports the complete first stage estimates corresponding to column (4) of Table 2.
26The minimum wages are published by the German secretary of commerce
(http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Wirtschaft/branchenfokus,did=313190.html), the union wages
are published by the Boeckler foundation (http://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_4428.htm), and
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“wage multipliers,” the ratio between the wage and the costs per job year, between 0.9
and 1.8.
The costs per job year from the German countercyclical investment program are of
a similar magnitude to the findings of a substantial share of the recent literature that
estimates the effects of fiscal policy on local economies. For contractions in infrastruc-
ture investments, Acconcia et al. (2014) find a local income multiplier of 1.5 to 2.0.
The €25’000 costs per job year correspond to $34’200 when using the average euro-
dollar exchange rate during the program. Several studies on the effects of aggregate
local fiscal spending in the U.S. find costs per job year of a similar size. For Medicaid
transfers in the context of the ARRA, Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) find costs per job
year of $26’000. For highway construction during normal times, Leduc and Wilson
(2013) estimate local income multipliers between 3 and 8. Using windfalls in general
public spending, Shoag (2010) and Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2016) find costs
per job year of $35’000 and $30’000, respectively. Both these studies also find local
income multipliers of 2.1 and 1.7 to 2.0. Assuming a labor share of income of two-
thirds, this implies a wage multiplier of roughly 1.3, which is well in the range of the
back-of-the-envelope estimates of the wage multiplier from the previous paragraph.27
6.2 Investments Reduce Unemployment
The results so far show that the countercyclical investments increased employment
quickly and cost-effectively. These employment gains could arise from different sources:
a reduction in unemployment, a reduction in the number of inactive individuals who
are neither employed nor unemployed, or flows out of self-employment into formal
employment, as the German employment data lacks information on self-employment.
Of these possibilities, flows out of unemployment are likely to generate rather sizable
economic gains, as they mobilize slack economic resources and reduce government
transfers. Moreover, preventing an increase in unemployment was the major policy
objective of the investment program. In this section, we thus ask whether investments
led to a reduction—or prevented an increase—in unemployment.
the labor costs are published by the German statistical office (series 62411). If the data distinguishes
between Western and Eastern Germany, we report the wages from West Germany. Hourly wages are
translated into yearly wages assuming a 40-hour work week. The data was accessed on November 25,
2016.
27These results suggest that fiscal policy is highly effective in stimulating local economies. However,
there are also a few studies (e.g., Conley and Dupor, 2013; Garin, 2016) that reach the opposite
conclusion.
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Table 3: The Effects of Countercyclical Investments on Unemployment
Unemployment Rate
IV Estimates OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investments p.c.
× 2007–Q3 2008 0.44 0.35 0.02 0.50 0.22 0.29
(0.52) (0.54) (0.52) (0.76) (0.22) (0.27)
× 2009 0.40 0.14 0.14 −0.01 −0.07 0.04
(0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.62) (0.17) (0.19)
× 2010 0.06 −0.69 −0.58 −0.86 −0.06 −0.02
(0.52) (0.61) (0.63) (0.84) (0.22) (0.25)
× 2011 −0.76 −1.56∗∗ −1.44∗∗ −2.08∗∗ −0.07 −0.07
(0.61) (0.69) (0.71) (1.01) (0.25) (0.30)
× 2012–2013 −0.60 −1.69∗∗ −1.47∗ −2.45∗∗ −0.02 −0.12
(0.64) (0.78) (0.80) (1.14) (0.26) (0.30)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Population Growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date Fixed Effects ×
State × UrbanIndex yes yes yes yes yes yes
Emp. Shares by Educ. no yes yes yes no yes
School Age Population no no yes yes no yes
Universities & Hospitals no no no yes no yes
min(Shea Partial R2) 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.07 . .
Job Years 0.30 2.11 1.88 2.95 0.19 0.05
90% CI of Job Years [-2.0; 2.6] [-0.5; 4.7] [-0.8; 4.6] [-0.8; 6.7] [-0.8; 1.2] [-1.1; 1.2]
Costs per Job Year 330492 47314 53102 33861 526480 2196241
SE Costs per Job Year 1537140 35844 45834 25889 1661597 34027952
Observations 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200
Notes. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate on each quarterly date between Q1 2007
and Q4 2013. Investments p.c. × 2007–Q3 2008 is the interaction of investments in €100’000 with an
indicator that equals one for the observations between 2007 and Q3 2008. All the other interactions are
defined accordingly; the baseline is Q4 2008. The horizontal lines between the estimates indicate the
beginning and the end of the stimulus program. Population Growth is the ratio of the current working-
age population and the working-age population in 2008. The following variables, measured in 2008,
are interacted with the full set of date fixed effects: State ×UrbanIndex (interactions of indicators for
the states and the values of the urbanization index), Emp. Shares by Educ. (shares of employees with
a college degree and with vocational training), School-Age Population, and Universities and Hospitals.
Min(Shea Partial R2) reports the minimum of the Shea R2 of the excluded instruments—the date
interactions of Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c.—among all the
first stages (one for each interaction of Investments p.c.). The number of Job Years is the sum of the
coefficients of Investments p.c. between 2009 and 2011. Costs per Job Year equal 100’000/Job Years.
The confidence intervals of Job Years and the standard errors of Costs per Job Year are calculated
via the Delta Method. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3 reports the estimates of the same empirical specifications as Table 2, but
this time with the unemployment rate as the dependent variable. The most parsi-
monious IV specification in column (1) does not detect statistically significant effects,
even though larger investments are associated with decreasing unemployment. Adding
covariates in columns (2) to (4), however, leads to estimated employment differences
similar to the corresponding employment effects. Mirroring the employment dynamics,
unemployment starts to decrease in 2010, and the effects peak in 2011. While the pro-
gram was active, investments of €100’000 reduced unemployment by 1.9 to 3.0 person
years, implying costs per “job” years between €34’000 and €53’000. The reductions
in unemployment thus amount to one-half to two-thirds of the respective employment
gains. A notable difference from the employment effects, however, is that the unem-
ployment effect persists into the post-program period. This could be in line with the
fading employment effect if parts of the individuals formally employed via the pro-
gram became self-employed when the investment projects were completed. Finally, as
regards employment, the OLS estimates of the unemployment effects are statistically
insignificant and considerably smaller than the corresponding IV estimates.
6.3 Investments and Employment Gains across Industries
A feature of investment programs is that they target specific industries so that there
is a clear hypothesis regarding which industries should experience employment gains.
The German investment program focused on stimulating local economies mainly by
financing the energy-saving remodeling of buildings. The program was thus, in the
first place, a building construction program.28 As a consequence, we expect to find
employment gains predominantly in construction related industries as well as in local
non-tradable industries.
To test this hypothesis, we analyze the effect of infrastructure investments on em-
ployment in the two “treated” industries, construction and local non-tradables, as well
as on employment in the remaining “untreated” sectors. The partition of the total
employment into these three subgroups is based on counties’ employment statistics at
the three-digit industry level as classified by the German Classification of Economic
Activities (Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige 2008 ). The data appendix (Appendix
3) provides the details regarding which industries are assigned to which of the three
28Funds were used for other purposes as well, though. For example, the project lists underlying
the investment data used in Appendix B.1 indicate that some schools used the investment funds to
upgrade their IT equipment.
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subgroups.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating the main empirical model (1) both via IV
and via OLS with the full set of controls and with the three groups of employment
by industry as dependent variables. These results correspond to the estimates of the
aggregate employment gains reported in Columns (4)—IV—and (6)—OLS—of Table 2,
respectively. Note, however, that the estimates are not fully comparable across Tables
2 and 4, as the employment data at the industry level is truncated at zero for county-
industry cells with few observations and only available from 2008 onward due to the
major revision of the industry classification in that year.
The IV estimates in Columns (1), (3), and (5) show that the main employment effect
originates almost exclusively from the targeted industries. Of the total employment
gains of 3.49 job years per investment of €100’000 estimated with the industry specific
data, 1.44 job years are gained in construction-related industries, and 1.54 job years
are gained in non-tradable industries. The untreated sectors amount to only 0.54 job
years. The IV results thus show that the investment program created employment
in the targeted industries. The converse holds for the OLS estimates, for which only
0.04 job years of the total employment gains of 0.82 job years can be attributed to
the treated industries combined, while 94 percent of the job gains are attributed to
industries that should have been unaffected by the program. One interpretation that
is consistent with the latter finding is that state governments indeed channeled funds
into counties in which (manufacturing) industries were expected to be hit the hardest
by the recession so that the association between investments and employment gains in
these industries picks up the recovery of manufacturing after the crisis.
6.4 Geographical Spillovers and Robustness
A plausible concern regarding our findings so far is that the employment effects may
be over- or underestimated due to geographical spillovers. For example, the estimated
effects would be too large if investments in one county increased the local wages and
thus reduced the employment in other counties within the same region. In contrast,
the estimated employment effects would be too small if there were sizable demand
spillovers across counties so that an increase in the labor demand within one county
boosts employment in adjacent counties as well.
To test whether there are geographical spillovers of an economically significant size,
we follow the approach of Acconcia et al. (2014) and add investments in neighboring
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Table 4: The Employment Effects of Investments by Industry
Employment p.c. in
Construction Non-tradables Other Industries
IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investments p.c.
× Q1 2008–Q3 2008 0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 0.54 0.05
(0.11) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.36) (0.11)
× 2009 0.27∗ 0.05 0.62∗∗ −0.01 −0.70 0.15
(0.15) (0.04) (0.25) (0.05) (0.57) (0.14)
× 2010 0.30 0.04 0.40 −0.05 0.24 0.21
(0.22) (0.06) (0.36) (0.08) (0.67) (0.22)
× 2011 0.86∗ 0.07 0.49 −0.05 1.00 0.41
(0.50) (0.19) (0.50) (0.11) (1.12) (0.37)
× 2012–2013 0.79 0.07 0.12 −0.19 −0.64 0.43
(0.50) (0.14) (0.65) (0.17) (1.51) (0.44)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Population Growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date Fixed Effects ×
State × UrbanIndex yes yes yes yes yes yes
Emp. Shares by Educ. yes yes yes yes yes yes
School Age Population yes yes yes yes yes yes
Universities & Hospitals yes yes yes yes yes yes
min(Shea Partial R2) 0.07 . 0.07 . 0.07 .
Job Years 1.44 0.16 1.51 −0.12 0.54 0.77
90% CI of Job Years [0.2; 2.7] [-0.3; 0.6] [-0.2; 3.2] [-0.5; 0.3] [-2.8; 3.8] [-0.3; 1.9]
Observations 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600
Notes. The dependent variable is employment in construction related industries (columns (1) and
(2)), non-tradable industries (columns (3) and (4)), and all remaining industries (columns (5) and (6))
on each quarterly date between Q1 2008 and Q4 2013, normalized by the working-age population.
Investments p.c. × Q1 2008–Q3 2008 is the interaction of investments in €100’000 with an indicator
that equals one for the observations between Q1 and Q3 2008. All the other interactions are defined
accordingly; the baseline is Q4 2008. The horizontal lines between the estimates indicate the beginning
and the end of the stimulus program. All the remaining variables and statistics are described in Tables
2 and 3. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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counties as an additional variable to the main empirical specification. For each county
we consider three possibile definitions of neighboring counties: all other counties within
the same labor market region (Raumordnungsregion), the five closest counties based on
the distance between the two counties’ most populous municipalities, and the ten closest
counties. For each set of a county’s neighbors, we calculate investment spillovers as the
total investments within the set of neighboring counties, normalized by the county’s
working-age population. These investment spillovers are instrumented by the aggregate
number of schools within the set of neighboring counties (normalized by the county’s
working-age population).
Table 5 reports the IV estimates of the investment-induced employment gains that
include potential investment spillovers. The effect of investments in neighboring coun-
ties on a county’s employment is negative in general and more than one order of mag-
nitude smaller than the direct employment effects. This suggests that the investment
program did not lead to major geographic shifts in economic activities across counties
so that geographical spillovers should be of little concern.
In Table 6 we evaluate the robustness of the empirical results with respect to a
number of alternative specifications. For brevity, each row of Table 6 documents the
results of a different specification and reports the average employment difference in
2011 (the peak of the employment gains in the main specification) and its standard
error clustered at the county level, the minimum of the Shea Partial R2 of all the
first stages, the number of job years and its standard error, the costs per job year,
and the number of observations. For comparison, row (0) reports these statistics for
the most demanding of the main specifications (column (4) of Table 2), which serves
as the baseline for all robustness checks. Before going into details, note that all the
robustness checks, except those using only the East German sample in rows (5) and
(10), yield estimates for the costs per job year that are within one standard deviation
of the baseline estimate.
The first set of robustness checks alters the specification of the empirical model
or the estimation strategy. Row (1) estimates the baseline specification using the
low information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator, which is less susceptible to
weak IV bias, but less precise. Weak IV bias may be an issue for the most demanding
specification, as the Kleibergen–Paap F statistic of the first stage is close to the common
critical value of 10 (Table 1). It is thus reassuring that the LIML estimates are very
close to their 2SLS counterparts. In row (2) we follow parts of the literature (e.g.,
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Table 5: The Employment Effects of Investments with Geographical Spillovers
Employment Rate
Set of Neighboring Counties: Baseline Labor Market 5 Closest 10 Closest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investments p.c.
× 2007–Q3 2008 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.20
(0.48) (0.45) (0.52) (0.47)
× 2009 −0.10 0.40 0.26 0.12
(0.54) (0.68) (0.63) (0.67)
× 2010 1.21 2.12∗∗ 1.98∗∗ 1.79∗
(0.78) (0.93) (0.95) (0.92)
× 2011 2.90∗∗ 4.25∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗ 3.56∗∗
(1.27) (1.32) (1.45) (1.39)
× 2012–2013 0.54 2.29 1.24 1.54
(1.67) (1.70) (1.80) (1.70)
Investments in Neighboring Counties p.c.
× 2007–Q3 2008 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
× 2009 −0.03 −0.05∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
× 2010 −0.04 −0.07∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
× 2011 −0.01 −0.04 −0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
× 2012–2013 −0.01 −0.03 −0.02
(0.06) (0.08) (0.03)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Population Growth yes yes yes yes
Date Fixed Effects ×
State × UrbanIndex yes yes yes yes
Emp. Shares by Educ. yes yes yes yes
School Age Population yes yes yes yes
Universities & Hospitals yes yes yes yes
min(Shea Partial R2) 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.07
Job Years 4.00 6.77 5.91 5.47
90% CI of Job Years [0.2; 7.8] [2.3; 11.2] [1.4; 10.4] [1.1; 9.8]
Observations 11200 11200 11200 11200
Notes. Investments in Neighboring Counties p.c. × 2007–Q3 2008 is the interaction of aggregate
investments (in €100’000 and normalized by the working-age population) across all other counties in
the same labor market region (column (2)), the 5 closest counties (column (3)), or the 10 closest coun-
ties (column (4)) interacted with an indicator for the dates 2007–Q3 2008. All the other interactions
are defined accordingly. The remaining variables and statistics are described in Table 2. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of the 94 labor market regions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Robustness
β(2011) SE Shea R2 Job Years SE(Job Yrs) Costs p. JY N
(0) Baseline 2.90∗∗ 1.27 0.07 4.00 2.31 25001 11200
Model Variants
(1) LIML 3.14∗∗ 1.43 0.07 4.33 2.56 23107 11200
(2) Weighted by labor force pop 2.25∗ 1.17 0.07 3.09 2.26 32368 11200
(3) Cluster: labor market region 2.90∗∗ 1.32 0.07 4.00 2.46 25001 11200
(4) West Germany only 3.14∗∗ 1.39 0.08 4.30 2.47 23270 9072
(5) East Germany only 0.71 2.78 0.07 1.31 5.68 76436 2128
(6) Employment ≥ 25 years of age 2.00∗ 1.08 0.07 2.89 2.11 34570 11200
Instruments
(7) All school types separately 3.25∗∗∗ 1.08 0.10 4.34 1.94 23059 11200
(8) All school types aggregated 2.11 1.34 0.04 3.62 2.69 27611 11200
(9) Instruments in 1995 (West Germany) 2.94∗∗ 1.24 0.09 3.08 2.22 32505 9072
(10) Instruments in 1995 (East Germany) −2.27 2.06 0.06 −2.07 4.45 −48421 2128
(11) Schools (2008) ≤ Schools (1995) 2.96∗∗ 1.40 0.07 4.43 2.70 22594 9688
Controls
(12) With short-time work 2.84∗∗ 1.27 0.07 4.23 2.33 23664 11200
(13) With Bartik shocks (baseline: Q1 09) 2.74∗∗∗ 0.91 0.07 4.35 1.69 22969 8000
(14) With industry structure 2.78∗∗ 1.22 0.07 4.31 2.23 23219 11200
(15) Additional age structure controls 4.29∗∗ 1.67 0.06 6.67 3.04 15003 11200
(16) Additional age structure by gender 3.28∗∗ 1.59 0.05 5.67 2.91 17652 11200
(17) Date × state FEs, area p.c. 4.04∗∗∗ 1.51 0.06 6.01 2.71 16629 11200
(18) Date × state FEs, area p.c., area2 4.01∗∗∗ 1.50 0.06 5.94 2.70 16835 11200
Notes. This table presents the results of various modifications of the baseline empirical specification given by column (4) of Table 2. Each
row represents the results of a different specification; see the text for details. Column β(2011) reports the coefficient estimate of Investments
p.c. × 2011 ; column SE reports its standard errors, clustered at the county level (except for row (3), where standard errors are clustered at
the level of the labor market region). Shea R2 reports the minimum of the Shea Partial R2 of the excluded instruments—the date interactions
of Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c.—among all the first stages (one for each interaction of Investments
p.c.). The number of Job Years is the sum of the coefficients of Investments p.c. between 2009 and 2011. SE(Job Yrs) is the standard errors
of Job Years calculated via the Delta Method. Costs per Job Year equal 100’000/Job Years.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Acconcia et al., 2014; Dupor and Mehkari, 2016) and weight the counties by their labor
force population in the estimation.29 Introducing weights leads to a slightly smaller
estimate for the number of job years created, but it remains well within the range of
estimates reported in Table 2. In row (3) the standard errors are clustered at the level
of 94 labor market regions (Raumordnungsregion) to account for the possibility of a
local correlation or errors beyond county borders. Doing so leaves the standard errors
almost unchanged. Next, we split the sample according to whether the counties were
part of former West or East Germany. The results in rows (4) and (5) suggest that
the employment effects are strong in West German counties but negligible in the East.
This result is plausible given that the backlog of public buildings in need of renovation
is likely to be low in the East due to the numerous infrastructure investment programs
implemented after reunification. In this case schools should also be a weaker predictor
of investments in East Germany than in the West, which is confirmed by the lower Shea
Partial R2 for the East German sample. Finally, row (6) estimates the employment
effects for employees older than 25 years of age to account for the potential concern
that counties with a high number of schools are populated by a relatively young labor
force with potentially distinct labor market dynamics. Despite excluding the part of the
labor force with the most elastic labor supply, economically and statistically significant
effects remain.
The second set of robustness checks modifies the instrumental variable strategy. In
row (7) the two instruments used in the main specification—the number of primary
and secondary schools and the number of academic high schools—are replaced by the
number of schools within each of the six school types included in the latter two cate-
gories (see Appendix A.2 for details). Conversely, in row (8) the aggregated number
of schools across all school types is used as the only instrument. While only the disag-
gregated number of schools yields statistically significant employment effects, the job
year estimates of both alternative specifications of the instruments are very close to the
baseline specification.30 The focus of the investment program was on renovating school
buildings so that old schools are expected to constitute a particularly good instrument
29The number of papers in the literature that do and do not weight observations by their population
are seemingly roughly equal. Other works that, like this paper, abstain from using weights in their
main specifications are those by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Wilson (2012), and Suárez Serrato
and Wingender (2016).
30The statistically insignificant result obtained when using the aggregate number of schools as the
only instrument may be due to a weak first stage as indicated by the relatively small Shea Partial R2
of this specification. This thus highlights the importance of distinguishing between small and large
schools.
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provided that they persist over time. We test this conjecture in rows (9) and (10) by
instrumenting, separately for West and East Germany, infrastructure investments via
the number of primary and secondary schools and the number of academic high schools
in 1995, the earliest date for which this data is publicly available. The results for West
Germany are the same as in the main specification, and the Shea Partial R2 indicates
that schools in 1995 are a strong instrument for investments. For East Germany, the
estimates are very noisy, possibly reflecting the extensive renovation and regional re-
structuring programs in the wake of reunification, which manifest themselves in lesser
needs for renovations as well as low persistence of the number of schools (as shown in
Figure 5 in Appendix B.3). Row (11), in turn, rules out the concern that having a
growing number of schools reflects a healthy local economy by restricting the sample
to those counties, for which the total number of schools in 2008 is weakly less than in
1995. Doing so leaves the empirical findings unchanged.
The third set of robustness checks explores whether altering the extensive set of
control variables of the main specification leads to different empirical results. In row
(12), we verify that controlling for short-time work, a sizable part of the German stim-
ulus package, does not affect the empirical estimates.31 Next, we investigate whether
the results are driven by industry-specific shocks that are, for some indeterminate rea-
son, correlated with the instruments. To this end, row (13) includes quarterly “Bartik
shocks” as an additional control variable (Bartik, 1991).32 This specification only in-
cludes data from 2009 onwards, because the employment data at the two-digit sector
level is only available starting in 2008 and because one year of data is needed to compute
the shocks. The employment differences in this specification are thus estimated relative
to employment in Q1 2009. Row (14) uses an alternative approach to account for indus-
try specific shocks. Here, the employment shares within each of the main sectors of the
economy—agriculture, manufacturing, and construction (the share in services serves
31Short-time work is an employment subsidy paid by the German employment agency (Bundesagen-
tur für Arbeit) to workers who are idle due to a temporary drop in demand below output potential.
Firms have to request the subsidy for their employees, the requirements of which were loosened during
the crisis resulting in a sharp increase in the number of workers receiving short-time work benefits
(see, e.g., Burda and Hunt, 2011, for a detailed description of the policy). We control for short-time
work using the full-time work equivalents of short-time workers. The data is published at quarterly
frequency by the German employment agency.
32Bartik shocks are defined as a county’s predicted employment level if its employment in each
two-digit industry would have grown at the same rate as employment within this industry across all
the remaining counties. Formally, the Bartik shock bc,t of county c on quarterly date t is given by
bc,t =
∑
s∈ 2-digit industries [(e−c,t,s − e−c,t−4,s)/e−c,t−4,s] × ec,t−4,s, where e−c,t,s (ec,t,s) is employment
in industry s on date t in all counties other than c (in county c).
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as the baseline)—measured in 2008 are interacted with date fixed effects, allowing for
very flexible, date-specific shocks correlated with the industry structure. Neither of
the ways of controlling for industry-specific shocks affects the empirical results. The
remaining four specifications explore alternative ways to control for plausible corre-
lates of the number of schools. Row (15) includes more extensive controls for the age
structure by adding the share of the population within the age brackets of 25 to 50
years of age and 50 to 65 years of age to the set of country characteristics that are
interacted with date fixed effects. Row (16) adds all of these age brackets (including
the school-age population between 6 and 18 years of age) separately for each sex. The
final two specifications introduce other means of controlling for population density.
Instead of the interactions of date, state, and the value of the urbanization index, we
add date fixed effects at the state level as well as counties’ area per capita interacted
with date fixed effects to the set of covariates in row (17). Row (18) also adds the
square of area per capita. Each of these alternative specifications yields estimates of
employment gains larger than the ones from the baseline specification.
We relegate additional robustness checks to Appendix C. Appendix C.1 rules out
the possible concern that the variation in countercyclical investments may over- or
understate the true differences in total fiscal investments if the stimulus funds lead to
crowding out or crowding in, respectively, of other regional public investments.33 Using
balance sheet data on counties’ budgets, we show that counties’ total investment ex-
penditures per euro of stimulus investments are on average at least as large as counties’
total investment grants per euro of stimulus investments. This suggests that stimu-
lus investments lead to crowding in of other investments rather than to crowding out.
Appendix C.2 shows that the estimated employment and unemployment effects do not
change significantly when they are estimated relative to average employment or average
unemployment between 2007 and 2008 instead of relative to Q4 2008. Appendix C.3
shows that collapsing the empirical model (1) into a cross-sectional specification yields
the same estimates of job years or reductions in unemployment years as the dynamic
models in Tables 2 and 3.
33Federal transfers for investments could have been crowded out if the stimulus funds had been used
to finance projects that had already been planned. However, the stimulus bill explicitly prohibited the
financing of projects that had already been budgeted. Federal transfers would have lead to crowding
in of local public funds if local governments had decided to add other infrastructure investments to
the one financed by the stimulus bill (e.g., using communal funds to add a new parking lot to a school
renovated using stimulus funds).
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7 Conclusion
Since the onset of the Great Recession, the effectiveness of fiscal policy in boost-
ing economic growth and employment has received renewed attention from academic
economists and policy makers alike. While there is new theoretical and empirical
evidence concerning the macroeconomic conditions under which fiscal policy may be
effective in general, the evidence regarding which particular types of policies are suc-
cessful in fostering growth and increasing jobs is still scarce.34 The contribution of this
paper is to show that infrastructure investment programs can increase employment
quickly and cost-effectively in the short run. Infrastructure investments can thus be a
viable tool to counteract an economic slowdown.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of investment programs may crucially depend on
their design. The German investment program studied here placed particular emphasis
on financing the renovation of buildings. Building construction is an industry charac-
terized by low levels of specialization and low geographic concentration compared with,
for example, highway construction. Moreover, the stimulus bill emphasized projects
implemented at the local level and mandated a tight deadline for the completion of
projects. Each of these factors may have contributed to the effectiveness of the program
in creating jobs at the regional level. One question for future research that originates
from our work is hence whether there are specific characteristics of investment programs
that make them more or less effective.
A related question is how the effectiveness of public investments in creating jobs
compares with the job creation of other major tools of fiscal policy, like direct transfers
to households or tax cuts. Although Parker et al. (2013) show that government trans-
fers have a high marginal propensity to consume, there is little evidence on how this
translates into employment gains in the short run. However, given that job creation is
a major policy objective, it is important for policy makers to know which of their tools
are most suitable for achieving it. By evaluating the effectiveness of one specific policy,
countercyclical investments, this paper takes a first step towards answering this ques-
tion. More research is needed to inform policy makers about the employment effects
of other policy tools at their disposal.
34For recent theoretical contributions regarding the effects of fiscal policy on output or employment,
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Appendix (for online publication)
A Appendix to Section 3: Data and Identifying Variation
A.1 Data Sources and Definitions





5, 6, 12, 14)
Employees subject to social security contribu-








Individuals receiving unemployment benefits







Employees subject to social security contribu-
tions in the county of residence in construction-
related industries (industry codes 41–43 (con-
struction), 461, 467, 475 (includes retail /
wholesale of construction materials, heating
installation and rental of construction equip-
ment), and 71 (includes architects and construc-
tion engineers) of the German Classification of










Employees subject to social security contribu-
tions in the county of residence in local, non-
tradable industries (industry codes 45–47 ex-
cept 461, 467, 475 (wholesale and retail), 55–56
(hotel and restaurant industry) of the German
Classification of Economic Activity) normalized











Employees subject to social security contribu-
tions in the county of residence in all the indus-
tries not included in “Construction” and “Non-










Total investment grants (Zuweisungen,
Zuschüsse für Investitionsförderungen) from
higher layers of government to a county and
all of its municipalities (normalized by the
working-age population). Yearly data. This
data is not available for all the states due to










Total invesment expenditures (Ausgaben für
Sachinvestitionen) a county and all of its munic-
ipalities (normalized by the working-age popu-
lation). Yearly data. This data is not available









The population of working age (between 15
and 65 years of age) in 2008. In our analysis,
most variables are normalized by the working-








Countercyclical Investments and Instruments
Investments p.c.
in € 100’000 (all
tables except Ta-
ble 8)
The sum of countercyclical investments between
2009 and 2011 within a county and all of its
municipalities. We aggregate investments from
the project lists using county and municipality
identifiers. Projects at the state level (without
a county or municipality identifier) are omitted.
Project lists of the
Federal Department








The sum of countercyclical investments be-
tween 2009 and 2011 into schools, universi-
ties, hospitals, and all the remaining types of
projects. Investments are allocated to project
types based on the project descriptions using
a textual matching procedure. This is possible
for all the states but Saxony-Anhalt, where the
project descriptions are not sufficiently detailed.
The project descriptions are not reported in the
project lists obtained from the federal govern-
ment described above. For this reason, the ex-
ercise in Table 9 uses project lists obtained from
the states.




the states (in most
cases the Department








The number of investment projects classified as
school related projects as well as all the re-
maining projects (normalized by the working-
age population). See above for details.






The number of schools within a county mea-
sured in 2008 (or 1995 in Table 6). The official
statistics provide the numbers of schools for ten
different school types. Based on the size of the
school types, these numbers are aggregated into
two categories to generate the main instruments
Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and









Tables 8 and 11)
The ratio of the working-age population in any







dex (all the ta-
bles except Ta-
bles 8 and 11)
A four-point urbanization index (sied-
lungsstrukturelle Kreistypen) with the cate-
gories metropolitan area (kreisfreie Großstadt),
city (städtischer Kreis), rural county with
towns (ländlicher Kreis mit Verdichtungsan-












Tables 8 and 11)
The ratio of employees with a university degree
to the total number of employees (also denoted
“Empl. Share with College” in Tables 1, 14,
15) and the ratio of employees with vocational
training to the total number of employees (also
denoted “Empl. Share with Vocational Tr.” in
Tables 1, 14, 15) as of 2008. The baseline is the











The ratio of the school-age population (between
6 and 18 years of age) to the working-age pop-






(all the tables ex-
cept Tables 8 and
11)
The number of PhD-granting universities with
at least 1000 students within a county as of 2015
(download date of the data: February 2015)
University statis-
















The ratio of short-time workers at each quar-
terly date to the working-age population in
2008. The measure of short-time work is the
full-time equivalent (Beschäftigungsäquivalent)






See Footnote 32 for the formal definition of Bar-
tik shocks bc,t. The shock bc,t is normalized by









A vector of three variables, all as of Q1 2008:
the share of employees in agriculture (industry
codes 01–03), the share of employees in manu-
facturing (industry codes 05–39), and the share
of employees in construction (industry codes
41–43). The omitted category is the share of











The ratio of individuals between 25 and 50 years
of age to the working-age population and the
ratio of individuals between 50 and and 65 years
of age to the working-age population, both as of







The total area of a county in km2 as of 2008. German Statistical
Office, area statistics
(code 171-01-4)
A.2 School Types and Sizes in Germany
There are several types of schools in Germany, both because students typically start
specializing in fifth grade and because the school system is organized at the state level,
so that there is some heterogeneity across states. In general, though, all students attend
a primary school (Grundschule) first, where children are allocated to schools based on
the school district. After primary school, students (and their parents) choose between
a number of secondary schools. Two types of secondary schools, Hauptschule and Re-
alschule, prepare students for vocational training, where the former is more focused
on manual work, while the latter is more focused on administrative work. If students
intend to go to college, they have to pass A-levels (Abitur), for which they need to
attend an Academic High Schools (Gymnasium). Furthermore, in some states there
are schools that combine Hauptschule and Realschule (called Schulen mit mehreren
Bildungsgängen in the school statistics), the first two types of secondary schools, as
well as schools that combine all three types of secondary schools (so called Compre-
hensive Schools or, in German, Gesamtschulen). The school statistics also include five
minor school types, namely preschools (Vorschule), a specific type of middle school
(schulartenunabhängige Orientierungsstufe), Waldorf schools (Waldorfschule, the most
prevalent type of private schools), and evening schools (Abendschule und Kollegs).
For the empirical analyses, we organize the data on schools as follows. Since
some states introduced the Schulen mit mehreren Bildungsgängen to combine the
non-academic tracks of secondary schools, we add this school type to the number
of secondary schools with administrative focus and call the resulting class of schools
Secondary Schools - administrative. Furthermore, we combine the five minor school
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Table 8: Summary Statistics: Students per School
Students per School (by School Type)
throughout Percentile of County Avg
Germany P10 P50 P90
Panel A: Primary and Secondary Schools
Primary & Secondary Schools 196 139 196 272
Primary Schools (Grundschule) 180 128 179 237
Secondary Schools - manual work (Hauptschule) 194 110 199 317
Secondary Schools - administrative (Realschule) 404 193 477 710
Secondary Schools - others 102 56 110 198
Panel B: Academic High Schools
Academic High Schools 788 496 834 1139
Academic High Schools (Gymnasium) 807 518 842 1154
Comprehensive Schools (Gesamtschule) 697 162 791 1206
Notes. This table reports the number of students per school by school type. This statistic is reported
as the nationwide average given by the ratio of the total number of students and the total number
of schools throughout Germany, as well as by its 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile across counties. See
the text for a description of the types of schools.
types within one category called Secondary Schools - others. Finally, as there is a
clear dichotomy among all the school types with respect to their size, we aggregate all
the school types into two groups: “academic high schools” (the sum of Comprehen-
sive Schools and Academic High Schools, which both offer A-levels) and Primary and
Secondary Schools (the remaining school types).
Table 8 provides statistics on the distribution of school size within the school types.
Specifically, it reports the average number of students per school for each major school
type throughout Germany, as well as the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the num-
ber of students per schools across counties. There is a clear size difference across
school types. On the one hand, Primary Schools, Secondary Schools - manual work,
and Secondary Schools - others have, on average, less than 200 students, and have a
narrow distribution of averages across counties with the 10th percentile larger than
100 students per school, and the 90th percentile smaller than 320 students per school.
Secondary Schools - administrative have 404 students on average and are thus slightly
larger than the remaining school types within the group of Primary and Secondary
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Schools. Nevertheless, the 90th percentile of Secondary Schools - administrative is
smaller than the median number of students per school in Academic High Schools
(Gymnasium) and Comprehensive Schools. These schools are, on average, about four
times as large as the average “primary and secondary school.”
B Appendix to Section 5: Identification Strategy
This section reports additional results supporting the identification strategy. Section
B.1 uses supplemental data on investments projects that entails the project descriptions
to show that the number of schools explains school related investments. Section B.2
presents the complete system of first stage equations of the main specification reported
in column (4) of Tables 2 and 3. Section B.3 shows that the number of schools in the
former West German states is more persistent than in the former East German states.
B.1 The Number of Schools Predominantly Predicts School Investments
In this section, we show that the number of schools indeed predominantly predicts in-
vestments into schools (as opposed to investments that had other purposes). Projects,
and, hence, investments, can be linked to their purpose via the project descriptions that
states had to communicate to the federal government. These descriptions are missing
in the complete list of investment projects obtained from the Federal Department of
the Treasury, which is the source of the investment data in the main part of the paper.
We were able to obtain project level data from a second source—the administrative
units of the states responsible for the distribution of funds—that includes these de-
scriptions for all the states with the exceptions of Bremen and Saxony-Anhalt. For the
states available, these project lists contain 96 percent of the projects and 95 percent
of investments. Based on this data, we assign the projects to funding lines (projects
related to schools, universities, hospitals and all the other types of projects) using a
textual matching procedure that applies a bag of words algorithm.
Columns (1) to (5) of Table 9 present the results of regressing the subsets of in-
vestments within different funding lines on the instruments as well as the full set of
covariates. Apart from the varying dependent variables, we use the same empirical
specification as the one underlying column (4) of Table 1, which we reproduce in col-
umn (1) of Table 9 for comparison. The results show that the number of schools
per capita is strongly correlated with investments in schools. Also, the number of
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Table 9: First Stage: Schools Predict School Investments
Countercyclical Investments p.c. in e 100’000 Projects
Total Schools Universities Hospitals Other Schools Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Academic High Schools p.c. 10.09∗∗∗ 4.51∗∗ 2.86 1.59∗∗ 1.94 1.07∗∗ 0.16
(2.98) (1.75) (1.81) (0.72) (1.25) (0.42) (0.39)
Primary & Second. Schools p.c. 1.53∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗ −0.08 −0.23 0.45∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.65) (0.43) (0.34) (0.21) (0.31) (0.16) (0.10)
Empl. Share w College /100 0.71∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.87∗∗∗ −0.15 −0.11 0.10∗ 0.02
(0.34) (0.14) (0.27) (0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03)
Empl. Share w Vocational Tr. /100 −0.10 −0.11 0.14 −0.18∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.13) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02)
Share School-Age Pop /100 0.01 0.50∗∗ −0.46 −0.12 −0.06 −0.04 −0.03
(0.42) (0.23) (0.30) (0.12) (0.20) (0.09) (0.05)
Universities p.c. 85.19∗∗∗ 8.68 77.99∗∗∗ −6.72 3.09 −0.56 −1.16
(21.92) (9.67) (16.93) (5.05) (7.98) (2.91) (2.68)
Hospitals p.c. 4.35 0.20 0.21 0.77 1.78 0.38 −0.06
(2.95) (1.22) (1.27) (0.81) (2.57) (0.40) (0.29)
State × UrbanIndex FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Kleibergen–Paap F 9.77 6.93 6.20 2.46 1.81 7.83 4.17
Shea Partial R2 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03
Observations 400 384 384 384 384 384 384
Notes. The dependent variable in column (1), Countercyclical Investments p.c. in €100’000 – Total, is the sum of investments normalized by
the working-age population (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”) over the years 2009 to 2011 using the investment data from the main part of
the paper (column (1) is identical to column (4) of Table 1). The remaining columns use a subset of the data that entails the project descriptions
to classify investment projects according to their purpose. The dependent variables in columns (2) to (5) are the sum of investments in schools,
universities, hospitals, and the sum of investments for all the remaining purposes. The dependent variable in column (6) is the number of
projects categorized as school related, and the dependent variable in column (7) is the number of all the other projects. The remaining variables
and statistics are defined as in Table 1. Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c. are the excluded instruments
for the Kleibergen–Paap F statistic and the Shea Partial R2. The sample is the cross-section of counties as measured in Q4 2008; in columns
(2) to (7) the counties within the states Bremen and Saxony-Anhalt drop, as the project descriptions are unavailable for these states. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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universities is strongly correlated with investments in universities. Only for hospitals
investments, the coefficient of the number of hospitals is not statistically significantly
different from zero. Also, the significant coefficients of Primary and Secondary Schools
p.c., when the dependent variable is investments in universities, and of Academic High
Schools p.c., when the dependent variable is investments in hospitals, are not as ex-
pected. However, these results may be due to the necessarily imperfect classification
procedure based on textual analysis.
In Columns (6) and (7), the dependent variables are the number of school related
investment projects and the number of all the other investment projects, respectively.
Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c. are strongly
correlated with the number of school projects and much less so with the number of
other projects. Specifically, there are, on average, more than twice as many projects
associated with one Academic High School as with one Primary and Secondary School.
This finding may contribute to explain why the average total investments per Academic
High School are six to seven times as large as total investments per Primary and
Secondary School in column (1).35
B.2 The Complete System of First Stage Equations
Table 10 reports the estimates of the complete system of first stage equations as de-
scribed by Equation (2). More specifically, Table 10 presents the first stage estimates
of the empirical results in column (4) of Tables 2 and 3, respectively.36 As such, the
coefficients of the interactions of Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Sec-
ondary Schools p.c. along the diagonal can be compared to the coefficients of the purely
cross-sectional first stage coefficients in Column (4) of Table 1. Both the coefficients
and standard errors of the system of first stage equations are very close to the ones for
the single cross-section, in particular for the time periods close to Q4 2008, the date
of the cross-section used for the estimations in Table 1. Moreover, the Shea Partial R2
35Another share of this difference in total investments per school may be explained by the different
sizes of academic high schools and primary and secondary schools pointed out in Appendix A.2.
36In Tables 2 and 3, we reduce the number of coefficients by interacting investments with indicator
variables that equal one for all dates prior to the investment program (Q1 2007 to Q3 2008) and all
dates after the end of the program (Q1 2011 to Q4 2013), respectively. For the years of the program
(2009–2011), we estimated one coefficient for each year. Footnote 23 gives the formal statement of
the relevant second stage. Table 10 applies the same procedure to the instruments of investments,
Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c. All the remaining variables are
interacted with dummy variables for each quarterly date exactly as described by the models (1) and
(2).
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Table 10: The Complete System of First Stage Equations
Countercyclical Investments p.c. in e 100’000 ×
2007–Q3 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Academic High Schools p.c.
× 2007–Q3 2008 10.10∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(2.97) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
× 2009 −0.00 10.09∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (2.97) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
× 2010 0.01 0.00 10.09∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.01
(0.06) (0.02) (2.97) (0.02) (0.06)
× 2011 0.01 0.00 −0.00 10.09∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (2.96) (0.09)
× 2012–2013 0.21 0.06 −0.02 −0.07 9.88∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (2.98)
Primary & Secondary Schools p.c.
× 2007–Q3 2008 1.52∗∗ −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
× 2009 0.00 1.53∗∗ −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
× 2010 0.00 0.00 1.53∗∗ −0.00 −0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.64) (0.01) (0.02)
× 2011 0.01 0.00 −0.00 1.52∗∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.64) (0.03)
× 2012–2013 0.05 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 1.48∗∗
(0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.64)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Population Growth yes yes yes yes yes
Date Fixed Effects ×
State × UrbanIndex yes yes yes yes yes
Emp. Shares by Educ. yes yes yes yes yes
School Age Population yes yes yes yes yes
Universities & Hospitals yes yes yes yes yes
Kleibergen-Paap F 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98 1.98
Sanderson-Windmeijer F 4.02 4.55 4.61 4.60 4.48
Shea Partial R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Observations 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200
Notes. This table presents the first stage equations of column (4) of Tables 2 and 3. The dependent
variable in column (1) is the sum of investments, normalized by the working-age population, interacted
with an indicator that equals one for the observations between 2007 and Q3 2008. All the other
dependent variables and interactions are defined accordingly. Academic High Schools p.c. is the
number of high schools in a county which award the “Abitur.” Primary and Secondary Schools p.c.
is the number of primary schools and secondary schools. The remaining variables and statistics are
described in Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 51
of the first stage equations in Table 10 and the cross-section are equal. These results
are as expected, given that each of the first stage equations in Table 10 is, by design,
identified almost exclusively from cross-sectional variation (only Population Growth
varies over time, and all the remaining covariates are interacted with the full set of
date dummies).
Testing for weak instruments in a setting with many endogenous variables and many
instruments is at the frontier of research in theoretical econometrics. Table 10 presents,
for each first stage equation, the F-statistic proposed by Sanderson and Windmeijer
(2016). Their test for weak instruments (sketched by Angrist and Pischke 2009) is
based on the application of the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem to each first stage. In a
first step, the testing procedure partials out, for one first stage equation the remaining
endogenous variables (instrumented by the complete set of instruments) as well as all
the exogenous covariates. In a second step, the resulting residuals are regressed on
the instruments, and an F-test on the coefficients of the instruments is performed.
This is done to assess whether the remaining explanatory power of the instruments is
sufficient to identify the first stage equation under consideration. Applied to each first
stage equation, the F-statistic proposed by Sanderson and Windmeijer hence allows to
evaluate the relevance of the instruments for each endogenous variable separately.
The results in Table 10 show that the instruments are equally informative for each
investment-period interaction. But the F-statistics are below the commonly chosen
critical value of ten, potentially indicating that the instruments are weak. However,
the Sanderson–Windmeijer F-statistic, which equals the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistic
in the single endogenous regressor case displayed in Table 1, only drops because each
additional interaction of Schoolsc is informative for only one endogenous variable and
uninformative for all remaining endogenous variables (as illustrated by the statistically
insignificant coefficients off the diagonal in Table 10). It is hence questionable whether
the F-statistic is a good diagnostic for detecting weak instruments in the specific em-
pirical model estimated here (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 215, for a similar
point).
We conduct one further exercise to assess whether the estimates of the dynamic
model described by (1) and (2) are potentially biased due to weak instruments. In
Appendix C.3 we transform Equation(1) to a cross-sectional model that allows us to
estimate the job years created by investments using only one endogenous variable and
two instruments. This standard IV setup delivers first stage F-statistics at the same
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Figure 5: The Autocorrelation of Schools between 1995 and 2008 in West and East
Germany
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Notes. This figure displays, for each county, the number of schools (net of their state averages and
separately for academic high schools and primary and secondary schools) in 2008 against the number
of schools in 1995. Observations in the former West German states are indicated as circles, and their
linear fit is given by the straight line. Observations in the former East German states are indicated
by diamonds, and their linear fit is given by the dashed line.
level of the ones reported in Table 1, and the estimated job years / costs per job year as
well as the corresponding standard errors are very close to the estimates from the main
specification reported in Table 2. These results reinforce the notion that the cross-
sectional tests for weak instruments are appropriate to evaluate the relevance of the
instruments in a specification like ours, in which the first stage is primarily identified
from cross-sectional variation.
B.3 The Persistence of the Number of Schools in West and East Germany
Figure 5 plots the number of schools in 2008 against the number of schools in 1995 (the
earliest date at which this data is available), separately for counties in the former West
German states (displayed as circles) and in the former East German states (displayed
as diamonds). In both years, schools are measured relative to their state averages.
Clearly, the number of schools in the West is more persistent than in the East. This is
particularly true for academic high schools, the stronger of the two instruments, where
the observations in the West German counties are tightly clustered around the 45 degree
line indicating a high persistence. In the East German counties, in contrast, the best
linear fit of the observations is close to a horizontal line indicating a low persistence.
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This result may be due to the significant restructuring of the administration in the
East German states in the wake of reunification. Due to the low persistence of the
number of schools in the East German states as well as the accompanying renovations
of the remaining infrastructure, the need for additional renovations via the stimulus
program was most likely significantly lower in the East than in the West. The lower
need for renovations in the East, in turn, may be the prime reason for not finding any
employment effect for the sample of the East German counties in the robustness checks
(Table 6).
C Appendix to Section 6: Results
This section provides additional results regarding the robustness of the main empiri-
cal findings. Section C.1 presents evidence that stimulus investments from the federal
government did not crowd out investments by counties and municipalities. Section C.2
shows that the estimated employment and unemployment effects do not change signif-
icantly when they are estimated relative to average employment or average unemploy-
ment between 2007 and 2008 instead of relative to Q4 2008. Section C.3 demonstrates
that collapsing the empirical model (1) to a cross-sectional specification yields the same
estimates of job years or reductions in unemployment years as the dynamic models in
Tables 2 and 3.
C.1 The Limited Fungibility of Countercyclical Investments
A common concern regarding the use of infrastructure investments as job creation
programs is that federal investment grants merely replace investments of local layers
of government. If this had been the case for the German investment program, the
investments undertaken via the program would not constitute a spending increase, and
our findings would be, by and large, spurious correlations.
To prevent a crowding out of local investments, the stimulus bill limited the fungi-
bility of the stimulus funds. The bill required that projects could only receive funding
if they were new and additional, meaning that they could not have been included in
the budget of regional or state governments. Also, the states could only receive federal
funds if their yearly investments exceeded 60 percent of the average yearly investments
before the crisis.
In the following, we conduct a simple test to check whether the investment funds
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provided by the federal and the state governments crowded out investments of the
counties and municipalities. To this end, we combine the data on countercyclical
investments, for which we know where they were spent but not how they were budgeted,
with yearly data on general investment grants received and on general investment
expenditures from the balance sheets of the counties and municipalities. Specifically,
we estimate the following two models:
Inv. Grants p.cc,y = ζpre Investments p.c.c × ✶ (y = 2007) +
ζduring Investments p.c.c × ✶ (y ∈ [2009, 2011]) +
ζpost Investments p.c.c × ✶ (y ∈ [2012, 2013]) +
CountyFEc + ǫc,y
Inv. Expenditures p.c.c,y = ηpre Investments p.c.c × ✶ (y = 2007) +
ηduring Investments p.c.c × ✶ (y ∈ [2009, 2011]) +
ηpost Investments p.c.c × ✶ (y ∈ [2012, 2013]) +
CountyFEc + ǫ̃c,y,
where the index y refers to years—the balance sheet data is published at yearly fre-
quency—, and where ǫc,y and ǫ̃c,y are the error terms. The difference ηduring −ζduring are
the local investments expenditures in excess of investment grants per euro of stimulus
investments within the counties’ borders. If this difference is negative, it would be in-
dicative of local crowding out of stimulus investments, as the average investment grants
received due to the stimulus would be larger than the counties’ average expenditures
into stimulus projects. Conversely, if ηduring − ζduring would be positive, this would be
indicative of crowding in.
Table 11 presents the estimates of the two models above. In columns (1) and
(3), the covariate of interest is total countercyclical investments, which is the same
variable as in the main part of the paper. In columns (2) and (4), the covariate of
interest is the countercyclical investments into schools, as defined in Appendix B.1.
The results show that higher total stimulus investments as well as higher investments
in schools are associated both with higher investment grants and with higher investment
expenditures of counties and municipalities. Compared to the respective values in 2008,
an additional euro of total investments within a county is associated with an average
yearly increase in investment grants of 7 cents, implying an increase of 21 cents over the
three year period of the stimulus program. However, the average increase in investment
expenditures is larger than the increase in investment grants. Here, one additional
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Table 11: The Correlation of Stimulus Investments with Total County Investment
Expenditures
Investment Grants p.c. Investment Expenditures p.c.
Investments (Indep. Var.): in total into schools in total into schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investments p.c. × 2007 0.01 0.00 −0.07∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Investments p.c. × 2009–2011 0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Investments p.c. × 2012–2013 −0.00 −0.02 −0.06∗∗ −0.13∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 2000 2000 2000 2000
Notes. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2), Investment Grants p.c., is the sum of in-
vestment grants to a county and all its municipalities from higher layers of government taken from
the balance sheets of counties and municipalities. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4),
Investment Expenditures p.c., is the sum of all the investment expenditures of a county and its munic-
ipalities taken from the balance sheets. Both variables are normalized by the working-age population
(as indicated by “p.c.” for per capita). Investments p.c. are either, in columns (1) and (3), the sum
of all countercyclical investments within a county (the variable of interest in the main text), or, in
columns (2) and (4), the sum of all school related investments (as defined in Appendix B.1). Invest-
ments p.c. × 2007 is the interaction of the relevant investment variable with an indicator that equals
one in 2007. All the other interactions are defined accordingly; the baseline year is 2008. The sample
includes all the counties for which the balance sheet data is available for both investment grants and
expenditures and all the years between 2007 and 2013. Standard errors clustered at the county level
are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
euro of total investments is associated with an average yearly increase of 13 cents, or
39 cents over the period of the investment program. The point estimates hence imply
a contribution of the counties and municipalities of 18 cents per euro spent on stimulus
investments, which is larger than half of the 25 cents per euro of total investments that
states, counties, and municipalities had to contribute according to the stimulus bill.
The same picture arises for investments into schools. Quantitatively, the invest-
ment grants and expenditures from the balance sheets are more strongly associated
with investments in schools than with the spending on all the investment projects. A
plausible reason for this finding is that schools are with few exceptions directly financed
by the counties and municipalities, in contrast to some of the other investment targets
of the stimulus program.
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C.2 Dynamics Relative to Averages of Employment and Unemployment
between Q1 2007 and Q4 2008
In the main text, we estimate the employment gains and unemployment reductions of
the investment program relative to Q4 2008, the last quarterly date before the program
was active. Calculating the gains and reductions relative to a single date allows us to
evaluate whether the instrumented investments are correlated with (un)employment
dynamics before the crisis. This comes at the potential cost that (un)employment levels
at the reference date may be (spuriously) correlated with the instruments, resulting in
potentiallly misleading estimates.
To rule out this potential concern, this section estimates the (un)employment gains
relative to average (un)employment during the years 2007 and 2008, the entire pre-
program period in the data. Specifically, we slightly modify the empirical model un-





βY Investmentsc × ✶ (t∈[Q1 Y,Q4 Y]) +





c Γt + ψ PopGrowthc,t + ε̃c,t.
The only difference to the model underlying the main results outlined in Footnote 23
is that the investment coefficient of the pre-program period vanishes.
Table 12 shows the results of estimating the model above with Employment p.c.
as the dependent variable, Table 13 shows the results for Unemployment p.c. as the
dependent variable. Across specifications, the employment gains are slightly smaller
than the ones reported in Table 2, and the unemployment reductions are larger than
the ones in Table 3 for the majority of the specifications. Overall, however, both
the employment gains and unemployment reductions are of similar magnitudes as the
corresponding estimates in the main text.
C.3 The Estimated (Un)Employment Effects of Investments Using the
Cross-Sectional Dimension of the Data
In the main empirical model (1) we interact the cross-sectional data on investments
across counties with indicator variables for the quarterly dates to estimate the dynamic
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Table 12: Effects of Investments on Employment Relative to Pre-Program Averages
Employment Rate
IV Estimates OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investments p.c.
× 2009 −0.26 −0.66 −0.24 −0.24 0.45∗∗ 0.20
(0.50) (0.53) (0.54) (0.72) (0.19) (0.19)
× 2010 0.71 0.78 1.21∗ 1.06 0.54∗∗ 0.21
(0.54) (0.64) (0.70) (0.92) (0.24) (0.24)
× 2011 2.07∗∗∗ 1.59∗ 2.20∗∗ 2.76∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.44
(0.72) (0.85) (0.94) (1.36) (0.31) (0.34)
× 2012–2013 2.34∗∗ −0.46 0.18 0.40 0.80∗ 0.27
(0.99) (1.14) (1.25) (1.68) (0.45) (0.46)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Population Growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date Fixed Effects ×
State × UrbanIndex yes yes yes yes yes yes
Emp. Shares by Educ. no yes yes yes no yes
School Age Population no no yes yes no yes
Universities & Hospitals no no no yes no yes
min(Shea Partial R2) 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.07 . .
Job Years 2.52 1.71 3.17 3.58 1.73 0.84
90% CI of Job Years [-0.1; 5.1] [-1.3; 4.7] [-0.1; 6.5] [-0.9; 8.1] [0.6; 2.8] [-0.3; 2.0]
Costs per Job Year 39656 58407 31546 27936 57807 118489
SE Costs per Job Year 24787 62259 19898 21345 22443 100026
Observations 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200
Notes. The dependent variable is the employment rate at each quarterly date between Q1 2007 and
Q4 2013. Investments p.c. × 2009 is the interaction of investments in € 100’000 with an indicator
that equals one for all the observations in 2009. All the other interactions are defined accordingly;
the baseline are the years 2007 and 2008. The horizontal lines between the estimates indicate the
beginning and the end of the stimulus program. Population Growth is the ratio of the current working-
age population and the working-age population in 2008. The following variables, measured in 2008,
are interacted with the full set of date fixed effects: State ×UrbanIndex (interactions of indicators for
the states and the values of the urbanization index), Emp. Shares by Educ. (shares of employees with
a college degree and with vocational training), School-Age Population, and Universities and Hospitals.
Min(Shea Partial R2) reports the minimum of the Shea R2 of the excluded instruments—the date
interactions of Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c.—among all the
first stages (one for each interaction of Investments p.c.). The number of Job Years is the sum of the
coefficients of Investments p.c. between 2009 and 2011. Costs per Job Year equal 100’000/Job Years.
The confidence intervals of Job Years and the standard errors of Costs per Job Year are calculated
via the Delta Method. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 13: Effects of Investments on Unemployment Relative to Pre-Program Averages
Unemployment Rate
IV Estimates OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investments p.c.
× 2009 0.02 −0.16 0.12 −0.44 −0.26 −0.22
(0.56) (0.61) (0.60) (0.85) (0.18) (0.20)
× 2010 −0.32 −1.00 −0.60 −1.30 −0.25 −0.27
(0.53) (0.64) (0.63) (0.88) (0.20) (0.22)
× 2011 −1.14∗ −1.87∗∗ −1.46∗∗ −2.52∗∗ −0.26 −0.32
(0.61) (0.73) (0.72) (1.05) (0.23) (0.26)
× 2012–2013 −0.98 −2.00∗∗ −1.49∗ −2.89∗∗ −0.22 −0.37
(0.70) (0.84) (0.83) (1.22) (0.27) (0.31)
County Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Population Growth yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date Fixed Effects ×
State × UrbanIndex yes yes yes yes yes yes
Emp. Shares by Educ. no yes yes yes no yes
School Age Population no no yes yes no yes
Universities & Hospitals no no no yes no yes
min(Shea Partial R2) 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.07 . .
Job Years 1.45 3.02 1.94 4.26 0.76 0.81
90% CI of Job Years [-1.1; 4.0] [-0.0; 6.1] [-1.0; 4.9] [0.1; 8.5] [-0.2; 1.7] [-0.2; 1.8]
Costs per Job Year 68969 33089 51433 23460 130836 122771
SE Costs per Job Year 74064 20196 47103 14072 96639 93883
Observations 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200 11200
Notes. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate at each quarterly date between Q1 2007
and Q4 2013. Investments p.c. × 2009 is the interaction of investments in € 100’000 with an indicator
that equals one for all the observations in 2009. All the other interactions are defined accordingly;
the baseline are the years 2007 and 2008. The horizontal lines between the estimates indicate the
beginning and the end of the stimulus program. Population Growth is the ratio of the current working-
age population and the working-age population in 2008. The following variables, measured in 2008,
are interacted with the full set of date fixed effects: State ×UrbanIndex (interactions of indicators for
the states and the values of the urbanization index), Emp. Shares by Educ. (shares of employees with
a college degree and with vocational training), School-Age Population, and Universities and Hospitals.
Min(Shea Partial R2) reports the minimum of the Shea R2 of the excluded instruments—the date
interactions of Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c.—among all the
first stages (one for each interaction of Investments p.c.). The number of Job Years is the sum of the
coefficients of Investments p.c. between 2009 and 2011. Costs per Job Year equal 100’000/Job Years.
The confidence intervals of Job Years and the standard errors of Costs per Job Year are calculated
via the Delta Method. Standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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effect of the countercyclical investment program. This strategy results in many en-
dogenous variables. We instrument these endogenous variables with date interactions
of the instruments, Academic High School p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools
p.c., which also vary predominantly along the cross-sectional dimension of the data.
As pointed out in Appendix (B.2), the properties of IV models with many endogenous
variables and many instruments are poorly understood. Also, every date interaction
of the number of schools is uninformative for all but one of the endogenous variables
so that the F-statistics of the excluded instruments in the first stage models in Table
10 at values that typically indicate weak instrument problems. This is despite the
fact that the number of schools seems to be a sufficiently relevant instrument in the
cross-section, as shown in Table 1.
However, we can also estimate the main statistics of interest from cross-sectional
empirical specification similar to the one used, e.g., by Dupor and McCrory (2015).
Starting with (1), we subtract Employment p.c.c,t on both sides, multiply by 1/4 and
sum over all the quarterly dates between Q1 2009 and Q4 2011, the dates during which
the stimulus program was active. Noting that in (1) we set all the coefficients of the
































(εc,t − εc,Q4 2008) . (3)
Note that (3) is a cross-sectional model, as we sum across dates. Also, the coefficient
of Investments p.c., 1/4
∑Q4 2011
t=Q1 2009 βt, directly gives the number of job years created
by the program, which is the main statistics of interest reported throughout the main
text. Estimating (3) thus recovers the statistic of interest with only a single endogenous
variable, for which we can instrument by the cross-section of the number of schools.
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The advantage of restating the empirical model in terms of (3) is that we can use all
the standard results regarding the estimation of IV models with a single endogenous
variable. The disadvantage is that the estimates of (3) are uninformative about the
dynamics of the employment effects.
Table 14 reports the estimates of (3), and Table 15 reports the estimates for the
variant of (3) in which the dependent variable is the compound of the unemployment
differences instead of the employment differences. The coefficients of Investment p.c.
estimated via IV and their 90 percent confidence intervals are very close to the job year
estimates from the main specifications in Tables 2 and 3.37 As with the panel model, the
IV estimates from the cross-sectional model thus imply that the investment program led
to substantial gains in employment and sizable reductions in unemployment. The OLS
estimates from the cross-sectional specification, in contrast, are weakly smaller their
counterparts in the main text. These estimates imply that the investment program
had both statistically and economically irrelevant effects on (un)employment. Finally,
the Kleibergen–Paap F-statistics of the excluded instruments are above the common
critical value of ten indicating that the instruments are relevant.
37With unemployment as the dependent variable, the results are virtually identical in the two most
demanding specifications.
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Empl. Ratet − Empl. RateQ4 2008
)
IV Estimates OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investments p.c. 2.80∗∗ 3.41∗∗ 4.04∗∗ 3.82∗ 0.71 −0.06
(1.32) (1.58) (1.72) (2.27) (0.61) (0.60)
Population Growth 0.40∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Empl. Share w College /100 9.55∗∗∗ 10.69∗∗∗ 13.31∗∗∗ 14.83∗∗∗
(3.47) (3.65) (3.50) (3.07)
Empl. Share w Vocational Tr. /100 6.58∗∗ 4.63∗ 5.85∗∗ 5.83∗∗
(2.70) (2.79) (2.85) (2.79)
Share School-Age Pop /100 11.52∗ 8.28 5.01
(6.67) (6.44) (5.85)
Universities p.c. −412.83 −71.73
(300.45) (193.29)
Hospitals p.c. 50.46 83.92∗∗∗
(31.47) (23.00)
State × UrbanIndex FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Kleibergen-Paap F 22.62 21.09 18.30 10.27 . .
Shea Partial R2 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.07 . .
Job Years 2.80 3.41 4.04 3.82 0.71 −0.06
90% CI of Job Years [0.6; 5.0] [0.8; 6.0] [1.2; 6.9] [0.1; 7.6] [-0.3; 1.7] [-1.0; 0.9]
Costs per Job Year 35703 29362 24735 26199 141661 -1674511
SE Costs per Job Year 16876 13597 10516 15584 121879 16700532
Observations 400 400 400 400 400 400
Notes. The dependent variable is the sum of the employment differences relative to Q4 2008 across
all the quarterly dates during the program period. Investments p.c. in € 100’000 is the sum of
investments normalized by the working-age population (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”) over
the years 2009 to 2011. Population Growth is the sum of the yearly growth of the working-age
population relative to 2008 given by 1/4
∑Q4 2011
t=Q1 2009 (WorkingAgePopc,t/WorkingAgePopc,2008 − 1).
Empl. Share w College and Empl. Share w Vocational Tr. are the share of employees with a college
degree and vocational training, respectively. Share School-Age Pop is the number of individuals
between 6 and 18 years of age as a fraction of the working-age population. Universities p.c. and
Hospitals p.c. are the number of universities and hospitals. State × UrbanIndex FE are fixed effects
for the interaction of indicator variables for the German states and for the values of a four-point
urbanization index. Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c. are the
excluded instruments for Investments p.c. underlying the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and the Shea
Partial R2. The sample is the cross-section of counties as measured in Q4 2008. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 15: Unemployment Effects from a Cross-Sectional Specification
1/4
∑Q4 2011
t=Q1 2009 (Unem. Ratet − Unem. RateQ4 2008)
IV Estimates OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investments p.c. −0.37 −1.91 −1.88 −2.95 −0.25 −0.10
(1.42) (1.56) (1.64) (2.26) (0.62) (0.73)
Population Growth 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Empl. Share w College /100 −4.96 −4.21 −4.21 −5.33∗
(3.31) (3.23) (3.17) (2.96)
Empl. Share w Vocational Tr. /100 −5.69∗∗ −6.63∗∗ −6.32∗∗ −6.30∗∗
(2.60) (2.68) (2.71) (2.63)
Share School-Age Pop /100 5.05 6.47 8.88∗
(5.06) (4.96) (4.61)
Universities p.c. 287.93 36.71
(266.20) (205.56)
Hospitals p.c. 51.15 26.51
(32.51) (24.66)
State × UrbanIndex FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Kleibergen-Paap F 22.62 21.09 18.30 10.27 . .
Shea Partial R2 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.07 . .
Job Years 0.37 1.91 1.88 2.95 0.25 0.10
90% CI of Job Years [-2.0; 2.7] [-0.7; 4.5] [-0.8; 4.6] [-0.8; 6.7] [-0.8; 1.3] [-1.1; 1.3]
Costs per Job Year -272630 -52463 -53217 -33872 -397400 -1030545
SE Costs per Job Year 1055917 42816 46350 25959 984706 7713300
Observations 400 400 400 400 400 400
Notes. The dependent variable is the sum of the unemployment differences relative to Q4 2008
across all the quarterly dates during the program period. Investments p.c. in € 100’000 is the
sum of investments normalized by the working-age population (indicated by “p.c.” for “per capita”)
over the years 2009 to 2011. Population Growth is the sum of the yearly growth of the working-age
population relative to 2008 given by 1/4
∑Q4 2011
t=Q1 2009 (WorkingAgePopc,t/WorkingAgePopc,2008 − 1).
Empl. Share w College and Empl. Share w Vocational Tr. are the share of employees with a college
degree and vocational training, respectively. Share School-Age Pop is the number of individuals
between 6 and 18 years of age as a fraction of the working-age population. Universities p.c. and
Hospitals p.c. are the number of universities and hospitals. State × UrbanIndex FE are fixed effects
for the interaction of indicator variables for the German states and for the values of a four-point
urbanization index. Academic High Schools p.c. and Primary and Secondary Schools p.c. are the
excluded instruments for Investments p.c. underlying the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic and the Shea
Partial R2. The sample is the cross-section of counties as measured in Q4 2008. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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